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INTRODUCTION 
In Hazelwood School District v. United States, the Supreme Court 
considered the hiring practices of a Missouri school district after a teacher 
alleged that the district had engaged in a “pattern or practice” of 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.1  
 
 1.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309 (1977).  A “pattern or 
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Prior to the Supreme Court’s review, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Missouri, determining whether the school district 
discriminated against teachers on the basis of their inclusion in a protected 
class, did not examine the availability of qualified individuals in the 
relevant labor market.2  Instead, the district court considered the percentage 
of students within the protected class that were in the local school district 
and compared them to the percentage of teachers in the same protected 
class that were employed by the district.3  The court concluded that the 
school district had not violated Title VII because the low proportion of 
teachers in the protected class mirrored the low proportion of students in 
the protected class in the student body.4  On appeal, the Supreme Court 
determined that the district court’s analysis was incorrect, finding that the 
demographic comparison of students and teachers was “irrelevant” to a 
finding of discriminatory intent.5 
Undoubtedly, in the context of establishing the discriminatory intent 
of a systemic disparate treatment case, the Supreme Court’s approach was 
the more logically coherent analysis.  Because student demographics of a 
school district do not necessarily correlate with the demographics of 
available teacher candidates, as the disparity may be the result of factors 
besides employer discrimination, it would be incorrect to infer 
discriminatory intent based simply upon a comparison of the teacher and 
student populations.  Since Hazelwood, a number of Supreme Court cases 
have established that the appropriate inquiry in some discrimination cases 
involves a comparison of the proportion of employees in the protected class 
and the proportion of qualified individuals in the protected class in the 
relevant labor market.6  However, the district court’s analysis that 
 
practice” case exists where a defendant-employer regularly engages in acts that deprive 
individuals of the full enjoyment of their Title VII non-discrimination rights; Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977).  Under the Teamsters framework, the 
plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing that the unlawful discrimination was a regular 
procedure or policy utilized by the employer.  The plaintiff is not charged with proving the 
employer’s discriminatory intent.  If the plaintiff satisfies its burden, the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove that the plaintiff was denied the employment opportunity for lawful 
reasons.  Id. at 336. 
 2.  United States v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 392 F. Supp. 1276, 1287 (E.D. Mo. 1975) 
rev’d and remanded, 534 F.2d 805 (8th Cir. 1976) vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 299 
(1977). 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 311 (agreeing with the Court of Appeals that the 
comparison should be made to the relevant labor market, but remanding the case to district 
court to determine that market). 
 6.  See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-51 (1989) 
(acknowledging that it is the “comparison-between the racial composition of the qualified 
HOERNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2014  2:49 PM 
2014] THE ROLE-MODELING BFOQ 1213 
 
compared the student population to the demographic composition of their 
teachers raises interesting questions about an educational hiring system that 
follows this approach.  This approach would allow school districts to hire 
certain individuals in an attempt to reflect the protected class identities of 
their student body.  This idea illustrates that although comparing the 
protected classes of educators and their students may be “irrelevant” in the 
context of establishing a systemic disparate treatment prima facie case, this 
relationship is anything but irrelevant when the overlap of protected classes 
is considered in the context of the bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ) exemption and the possible impact that demographic convergence 
could have on academic achievement. 
This comment will explore the relationship of the same-sex BFOQ 
defense and its possible application in the educational sphere.  Part I has 
served as an introduction to the material, exploring the general concepts 
that are at play in the context of employment discrimination and systemic 
disparate treatment cases.  Part II of the comment explores the statutory 
provisions of Title VII that are relevant to the BFOQ analysis and, 
additionally, delves into the Supreme Court and lower courts’ reading of 
the same-sex BFOQ standard.  In Part III, the comment identifies the lower 
courts’ acceptance of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ, illuminating the 
courts’ inconsistent treatment of the defense as well as its conceptual 
overlap with other same-sex BFOQs.  Part IV explains the logical 
consistency behind the establishment of a standalone role-modeling BFOQ, 
which does not lie in combination with other same-sex BFOQs.  
Additionally, Part IV culminates in an explanation of the potential impact 
of the role-modeling BFOQ’s application in the context of educational 
institutions.  Finally, Part V summarizes the findings of the comment and 
considers the future of same-sex BFOQs in the educational sphere. 
 
persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs-that generally forms the 
proper basis for the initial inquiry in a disparate-impact case”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 
Santa Clara Cnty., Cal., 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (finding that an employer’s affirmative 
action program for a special skill position would be justified if the employer demonstrates a 
manifest imbalance in their workforce, which can be proved through a comparison of the 
positions that demand special training and those in the labor force who possess the relevant 
qualifications); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 56 (1984) (considering the parties’ 
arguments concerning the relevant labor market in a Title VII “pattern or practice” case). 
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I.   THE FORMATION OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE: THE 
ACCEPTANCE OF DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 
DECISIONS 
A. Statutory Background 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 establishes a stringent barrier 
to discriminatory acts by prohibiting the pervasive gender discrimination 
that has historically prevented women from accessing equal opportunities 
in the workplace.7  However, Title VII originated as a protective measure 
for individuals who had suffered race, religion, and national origin-based 
discrimination.  The inclusion of gender protections in the landmark 
legislation was added on the floor of the House of Representatives where it 
was only conceived as an eleventh-hour legislative strategy to defeat the 
passage of the broader statute.8  At the time, critics of Title VII argued that 
the inclusion of gender-based protections mandated further meetings, 
hearings, and findings, as gender was fundamentally different from the 
other types of protected classes in the bill and, consequently, should be 
treated in separate legislation.9  Therefore, the critics argued, Title VII 
could not pass in its current form.10  Yet, the argument failed to carry the 
day and Title VII was passed with the amendment to protect gender 
 
7.  “It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in 
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”   
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 8.  110 CONG. REC. 2547–84 (1964) (record of the offering to amend the statute to 
include women).  On the floor, Congressman Howard W. Smith read a letter from a female 
constituent who lobbied for gender-based protections by explaining that women needed jobs 
to compensate for their inability to find a husband.  Smith, in introducing the gender-based 
provision, facetiously asked his Congressional colleagues: “[W]hy the Creator would set up 
such an imbalance of spinsters, shutting off the ‘right’ of every female to have a husband of 
her own, is, of course, known only to nature.  But I am sure you will agree that this is a 
grave injustice.” Id, at 2577 (1964). 
 9.  See id. (statement of Rep. Celler quoting letter from United States Department of 
Labor); id. at 2584 (statement of Rep. Green arguing for the careful consideration of 
biological differences between men and women in the context of employment). 
 10.  See id. (noting critics’ views regarding the inclusion of gender-based protections in 
the bill). 
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discrimination fully intact.11 
Under Title VII, sex-based discrimination claims arise in a variety of 
forms and may be supported by different classifications of evidentiary 
support.12  Courts have recognized a spectrum of claims, including 
disparate treatment claims, which allege that a plaintiff is a member of a 
protected class, that they are qualified for a position, and that they suffered 
an adverse employment action, or at least were treated differently than 
similarly situated employees.13  In systemic disparate treatment claims, a 
subset of disparate treatment cases, plaintiffs may prove disparate treatment 
on two grounds.  First, the plaintiff may demonstrate that the employer has 
announced a formal policy of discrimination.14  Second, a plaintiff who 
fails to allege or demonstrate that the employer utilized a formal policy 
may establish a valid systemic disparate treatment claim by demonstrating 
that the employer used a pattern of employment choices that illustrates a 
practice of disparate treatment.15 
Courts have established three defenses to a plaintiff’s systemic 
disparate treatment claim.  First, a defendant-employer may challenge 
the factual basis of the plaintiff’s case, attacking the proof that 
underlies the plaintiff’s claim.16  Second, when the plaintiff utilizes 
statistics to establish the systemic disparate treatment case, the 
defendant-employer may challenge the inference of discriminatory 
intent that the plaintiff urges.17  An employer’s third possible defense 
to a plaintiff’s systemic disparate treatment case is preserved in the 
text of Title VII, where the statute explicitly allows employers to 
discriminate during employment decisions on the basis of an 
 
 11.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006). 
 12.  See generally, Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling Disparate Impact and Disparate 
Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 95, 105-06 (2006) 
(discussing the framework for considering disparate treatment). 
 13.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (outlining the 
initial burden of the complainant to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in a 
Title VII trial). 
 14.  See City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 
(1978) (stating that a policy requiring higher contribution into a fund simply due to being a 
woman constitutes discrimination). 
 15.  See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 (1977) (basing a 
Title VII violation on whether a certain group had been treated regularly and purposely less 
favorably, and whether these differences were racially motivated). 
 16.  See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 338 (1977) (stating that a defendant 
“may endeavor to impeach the reliability of the [plaintiff’s] statistical evidence, [and] may 
offer rebutting evidence”). 
 17.  See EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302, 322 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding 
that disparate results were reasonably shown to be attributable to the women’s low interest 
rather than the employer’s lack of encouragement from the employer). 
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individual’s inclusion in a protected class.18  In contravention to the 
broader theme of the text, Congress included language in Title VII that 
protected discrimination on the basis of inclusion in a protected class 
when being part of that class was a BFOQ for the position of 
employment.19  Section 703(e) of Title VII provides that: 
 
 . . . it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his 
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where 
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that 
particular business or enterprise.20  
 
Unfortunately, due to the limited consideration and debate over the 
inclusion of gender in Title VII, there is a dearth of information concerning 
the motivation, treatment, and standard of the BFOQ in Title VII’s 
legislative history.  After the House adopted sex as a protected class, 
several Representatives urged the House to mirror the amendment in the 
already existing BFOQ section as well.21  At the time, Representative 
Goodell of New York highlighted the utility of a gender-based BFOQ, 
stating that: 
 
[t]here are so many instances where the matter of sex is a 
[BFOQ].  For instance, I think of an elderly woman who wants a 
female nurse. There are many things of this nature which are 
bona fide occupational qualifications, and it seems to me they 
would be properly considered here as an exception.22 
 
Congresswoman Green, who had actively voiced her opposition to 
amending Title VII to include gender discrimination, found that many of 
her concerns were ameliorated by the inclusion of gender in the BFOQ 
umbrella.  She stated: 
 
[it] make[s] a great deal of difference to [an] elderly woman and 
her family as to whether [a] qualified nurse is a man or a woman.  
Under the terms of [gender-based discrimination] the hospital 
 
 18.  See 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (2006) (permitting hiring and employment based on 
religion, sex, or national origin when it would be a bona fide occupational qualification). 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  See 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964) (statement by Rep. Goodell). 
 22.  Id. 
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could not advertise for a woman registered nurse because under 
the [gender] amendment . . . this would be discrimination based 
on sex.  The suggestion of [Mr. Goodell] helped a great deal, 
however.23 
 
Congresswoman Green’s closing sentence, explaining that Goodell’s 
amendment “helped a great deal,” implied that she personally believed that 
amending the BFOQ provision to include gender would remediate some of 
the danger posed by a strict reading of the language that barred sex 
discrimination.24  Yet, these explanations, which seemingly defined the 
BFOQ defense as a broad provision, were some of the rare moments that 
the BFOQ subsection was considered in the House. 
Comparatively, the Senate’s debate provides limited but additional 
demarcation, illuminating the BFOQ exception’s boundaries as a fairly 
limited provision.  Senator John McClellan, a staunch opponent of Title 
VII, sought to introduce multiple amendments that would weaken the 
strength of Title VII.  Specifically, one amendment aimed to broadly 
preserve an employer’s business discretion, allowing him or her to 
discriminate when, on the basis of “substantial evidence,” the employer 
subjectively believed that discriminatory hiring practices would be “more 
beneficial” to the normal operations or goodwill of their particular 
business.25  However, Senator Clifford Case, the floor manager of the bill, 
countered that expanding the BFOQ provision to provide employers with 
broad discretion in discriminatory hiring practices would swallow the 
ultimate objective of the bill, fundamentally eliminating the legislation’s 
protective power.26  Senator McClellan’s amendment to the BFOQ 
 
 23.  Id. at 2720. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  See 110 CONG. REC. 13,825 (1964) (statement of Senator McClellan).  
Commentators have argued that the Senate’s ultimate rejection of Senator McClellan’s 
goodwill argument implies that employers have extremely limited discretion in considering 
customer preferences, which is the “major component” of goodwill when making 
employment decisions. Michael L. Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide 
Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (1977) [hereinafter Siriota]. 
 26.  See 110 CONG. REC. 13,825 (1964) (statement of Senator Case: “We who believe in 
fair employment practices and the intervention of the Federal Government in this field to the 
extent provided for by the leadership amendment must resist the amendment of the Senator 
from Arkansas with all the power, because it would destroy the bill.”).  Senator Case 
additionally introduced a separate amendment, unrelated to the BFOQ exception, which had 
previously been introduced and defeated in the House of Representatives.  The amendment 
provided that Title VII actions would be limited to decisions or practices based solely on 
sex, race, national origin, or religion.  Again, in the floor debate, Senator Case highlighted 
that the amendment would place a heavy burden on plaintiffs, undermining the purpose the 
entire statute.  The amendment also failed to garner support. 
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provision was subsequently defeated by a vote of sixty-one to thirty, 
implying the Senate’s understanding of the BFOQ exception as a provision 
with limited sweep.27 
In 1965, prior to court interpretation of the BFOQ provision, a House 
report on the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1965 provided an 
opportunity for Congress to clarify its reading of the crucial subsection.  
While the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1965 was a legislative 
source entirely separate from the Civil Rights Act, it also contained the 
term “bona fide occupational qualification.”  The House Education and 
Labor Committee’s report on the legislation explained that the BFOQ is: 
 
meant to apply in those rare circumstances where a reasonable, 
good faith, cause exists to justify occupational distinctions based 
upon religion or national origin, or the more common 
circumstances, widely accepted by contemporary standards, 
where a reasonable, good faith, and justifiable ground exists to 
perpetuate occupational distinctions based upon sex.28 
 
Although legislatively distinct from Title VII, the temporal proximity 
and conceptual overlap between the two BFOQ provisions implies that 
Congress intended the Title VII BFOQ defense to have a similarly limited 
scope of application. 
Ultimately, however, due to a confluence of factors, including the 
rapid inclusion of gender as a protected class in Title VII, the BFOQ 
provision’s lack of prolonged debate, and the conflicting congressional 
treatment of the BFOQ exemption, the BFOQ exemption had been 
abandoned in murky territory, without clear scope or application.  Yet, it is 
worth noting that the provision had some areas of clarity.  Congress 
explicitly did not include race in the BFOQ exception as a result of the 
United States’ historical discrimination against people in racial minority 
groups, as well as due to the belief that there are no occupations that people 
of a specific race could perform that other races could not.29  But, the 
 
 27.  Id. at 13,826.  However, some commentators have argued that the overwhelming 
defeat of Senator McClellan’s amendments were the result of acts of Congressional 
solidarity and not their understanding of the scope of the bill.  See Sirota, supra note 25 at 
1030 (discussing considerations that may have led to the Senate’s rejection of McClellan’s 
proposed amendments).  Indeed, the commentators have argued that the BFOQ exception 
was intended as a broad exception.  See Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-
GYN: A Proposal for Expansion of the Privacy BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 357, 368 (2004) (elaborating upon and discussing the BFOQ defense in Title 
VII legislative history) [hereinafter Waldman]. 
 28.  H.R. Rep. No. 718 at 5 (1965) [emphasis added]. 
 29.  See 110 CONG. REC. 2550 (1964) (statement of Senator Cellar: “We did not include 
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broader application of the law was still unclear.  Commentators recognized 
that if the BFOQ exception was construed broadly, as Senator McClellan 
advocated, it would give way to the pervasive discrimination that had 
prompted the enactment of Title VII; whereas, if the courts applied an 
overly narrow reading, the BFOQ exception would offer little security to 
employers who argued that they deserved some level of discretion in their 
hiring practices and that, at times, employment decisions that were based 
upon an individual’s inclusion or exclusion in a protected class were 
necessary to effectively operate their business.30 
B. The Supreme Court’s Narrow Reading of the BFOQ Exception 
The Supreme Court encountered its first substantive opportunity to 
demonstrate its reading of the BFOQ exception in 1977, dissipating some 
of the fog that had persisted after Congress’s cluttered treatment of the 
defense.31  In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court endorsed the 
BFOQ exemption but only as a narrow exception to Title VII’s sweeping 
stance against discrimination.32  Dothard involved a female who sued an 
Alabama state penitentiary after she applied for a “contact” correctional 
counselor position and was denied the employment.33  The penitentiary 
defended the suit on several grounds, including an assertion that being male 
was a BFOQ for contact positions.34  While the Supreme Court offered a 
limited reading of the BFOQ clause, stating that it was “an extremely 
narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination on the basis 
of sex,” the Court accepted the penitentiary’s argument that male gender 
was a BFOQ for contact positions in the penitentiary.35  The Court found 
 
the word ‘race’ because we felt that race or color would not be a bona fide qualification, as 
would be ‘national origin.’  That was left out.  It should be left out.”). See also 110 CONG. 
REC. 2556 (1964) (Senator Cellar explaining why Congress should reject an amendment to 
add race as a BFOQ: “[T]he basic purpose of title VII is to prohibit discrimination in 
employment on the basis of race or color.  Now the substitute amendment, I fear would 
destroy this principle. It would permit discrimination on the basis of race or color. It would 
establish a loophole that could well gut this title.”). 
 30.  Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 
YALE L.J. 1257, 1258-59 (2003) [hereinafter Kapczynski]. 
 31.  Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
 32.  Id. at 334. 
 33.  Id. at 323-24. 
 34.  Id. at 332-33. 
 35.  Id. at 334-37.  Courts and commentators have separated, conceptually, the terms of 
gender and sex. Where “sex” is defined by the biological differences between men and 
women, “gender” concerns the socially constructed expected manner in which one is 
supposed act as a result of their sex.  However, because Title VII prohibits discrimination 
based on gender as well as sex, and the close dissection of these terms is not crucial to this 
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that the male-only policy was rooted in the penitentiary’s real concerns for 
the central function of the job – physical safety – and highlighted that in the 
violent environment of the Alabama prison, it would be reductionist to 
label the regulation as “romantic paternalism.”36  The Court explained that 
because it was reasonable to think that the inherent “womanhood” of the 
female guards would encourage sex offenders with a history of crime 
towards women to commit subsequent crimes, the presence of women in 
the correctional atmosphere would undermine “[t]he essence of a 
correctional counselor’s job” – to maintain prison security.37  
Consequently, despite employing a narrow reading of the BFOQ clause, the 
Court accepted the correctional facility’s male-only BFOQ defense.38 
 Eight years later, in Western Air Lines v. Criswell, the Supreme Court 
refined its interpretation of the BFOQ exception, this time in the context of 
a lawsuit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA).39  The ADEA provides for a BFOQ defense in language that 
mirrors the BFOQ language of Title VII and in Western Air Lines, the 
Court illustrated that its analysis of the exception was identical under both 
pieces of legislation.40  In Western Air Lines, the Court encountered an 
employment policy that required flight engineers, the third “pilot” in larger 
commercial aircraft during the era, to retire at age sixty.41  At the time of 
the lawsuit, the Federal Aviation Administration refused to establish a 
mandatory retirement age for flight engineers but required both pilots and 
first officers on commercial flights to retire at age sixty.42  At that time, the 
ADEA generally prohibited employers from mandating retirement before 
age seventy and, consequently, the employer argued that age sixty was a 
 
comment, the terms will be used interchangeably.  See Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 
1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (highlighting the law’s broad indifference to distinctions between 
gender and sex).  Moreover, this treatment within the comment is not inconsistent with the 
term’s treatment in discrimination law.  Commentators have highlighted that “[t]he word 
‘gender’ has come to be used synonymously with the word ‘sex’ in the law 
of discrimination” and while this treatment is imperfect, it is consistent.  Jonathan A. 
Hardage, Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises, Inc. and the Legacy of Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins: Does Title VII Prohibit “Effeminacy” Discrimination?, 54 ALA. L. 
REV. 193, 195 (2002). 
 36.  Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 336-37. 
 39.  Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1985) (describing 
Congress’s general guidance on age classification under Title VII for bona fide occupational 
qualifications). 
 40.  Id. at 416. 
 41.  Id. at 403-05. 
 42.  Id. at 404. 
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BFOQ for flight engineers.43  The defendant’s evidence highlighted that the 
possibility of heart attacks positively correlated with increases in age and, 
therefore, the defendant argued that the age sixty retirement provision was 
out of concern for the physical safety interests of the airline’s passengers.44  
On appeal, the defendant-airline challenged a jury instruction, which 
combined the statutory language of the ADEA and the Dothard precedent, 
reading that the “BFOQ defense is available only if it is reasonably 
necessary to the normal operation or essence of defendant’s business.”45  
The trial court informed the jury that “the essence of Western’s business is 
the safe transportation of their passengers” and additionally stated: 
 
One method by which defendant Western may establish a   
BFOQ in this case is to prove: 
(1) That in 1978, when these plaintiffs were retired, it was 
highly impractical for Western to deal with each second officer 
over age [sixty] on an individualized basis to determine his 
particular ability to perform his job safely; and 
(2) That some second officers over age [sixty] possess traits 
of a physiological, psychological or other nature which preclude 
safe and efficient job performance that cannot be ascertained by 
means other than knowing their age.46 
 
The Supreme Court, relying on the consensus of a number of U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, as well as an EEOC regulation, approved the jury 
instruction.47  Citing the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court 
found that, alternatively, an employer could establish a BFOQ defense if it 
“had . . . a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all [of the 
persons in the protected class] would be unable to perform safely and 
efficiently the duties of the job involved.”48  While the latter standard is 
used with less frequency than the one established in the jury instructions, 
courts have utilized both standards in establishing a BFOQ defense.49  
 The Supreme Court’s most recent and notable analysis of the BFOQ 
exception arrived in 1991 when it considered an employer’s fetal protection 
 
 43.  Id. at 406. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 407. 
 46.  Id. at 407-08. 
 47.  Id. at 416-17. 
 48.  Id. at 414 (quoting Weeks v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 
1969)). 
 49.  See Torres v. Wis. Dept. of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1530 (7th Cir. 
1988) (utilizing the “substantially all” standard in the BFOQ context). 
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policy.50  In International Union, UAW. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., the 
Supreme Court continued its narrow reading of the BFOQ exception, 
rejecting a battery-manufacturer’s same-sex BFOQ defense of a policy that 
excluded women who were capable of bearing children from positions that 
exposed the women to lead.51  While the defendant-corporation argued that 
its fetal-protection policy fell within the third-party safety exception 
BFOQ, which the court had considered in Western Air Lines, the Supreme 
Court relied on the specific language of the BFOQ defense to reject the 
employer’s argument.52  The Supreme Court highlighted that the BFOQ 
exception limited its application to “occupational” skills and aptitudes.53  
Consequently, although past Supreme Court cases considered BFOQs on 
the basis of third-party safety, examining the safety of the inmates in 
Dothard and the safety of the passengers in Western Airlines, the safety of 
the third parties was part of the “essence of the business,” e.g. the safety of 
inmates and the safety of passengers.54  Comparatively, the safety of the 
unborn fetuses in International Union played no part in the “essence” of 
the employer’s business, which was manufacturing batteries.55  While the 
employer urged a broader interpretation of the BFOQ exception, suggesting 
that the welfare of the next generation could be considered part of the 
“essence” of its business, the Court rejected the argument, continuing its 
trend of a limited reading of the BFOQ exception.56 
C. The Lower Courts’ Reading of the BFOQ Exception 
In spite of the Supreme Court’s extremely narrow reading of the 
BFOQ provision, cases which primarily focused on the employer’s interest 
in the physical safety of third-parties, the lower courts have extrapolated 
from Title VII and the Supreme Court’s reading of its text a variety of 
different employer interests that may establish a sex-based BFOQ.  
 
 50.  Int’l Union UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991). 
 51.  Id. at 204. 
 52.  Id. at 201-202; Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 406 (1985). 
 53.  Int’l Union UAW, 499 U.S. at 202-03; Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 
(1977); Western Air Lines, Inc., 472 U.S. at 401. 
 54.  Int’l Union UAW, 499 U.S. at 202-03. 
 55.  Id. at 203. 
 56.  Id.  Notably, Justice White highlighted in his concurrence his concern for the 
Court’s narrow application of the BFOQ rule, fearing that such a reading would fail to 
protect at least one same-sex BFOQs that the lower courts had already established.  He 
wrote that “[t]he Court’s interpretation of the BFOQ standard also would seem to preclude 
considerations of privacy as a basis for sex-based discrimination, since those considerations 
do not relate directly to an employee’s physical ability to perform the duties of the job.” Id. 
at 219 n.8. 
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Commentators have split over the manner of labeling and dividing the 
lower courts’ BFOQ exceptions, naming the BFOQs different things and 
dividing them in different ways, reflecting the opaqueness of justification 
behind some of the courts’ decisions.57  Generally, however, the courts 
have recognized three types of broad employer interests that, when 
demonstrated by an employer, establish a valid same-sex BFOQ defense.  
First, lower courts have recognized an employer’s BFOQ defense when the 
employer demonstrates that they have an interest in protecting the privacy 
of their clientele, who desire only to be viewed by members of their same 
gender.58  Second, courts have found that an employer establishes a valid 
sex-based BFOQ when the employer illustrates that it is part of the essence 
of a position to “rehabilitate” their clientele, which can only be effectively 
performed by members of the client’s same gender.59  Third, the lower 
courts, following in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Dothard decision, 
have allowed employers to establish a BFOQ defense when the physical 
safety interests of the employer and third-parties would be jeopardized by a 
hiring policy that did not discriminate on the basis of gender.60 
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly accepted a privacy 
interest BFOQ, the lower courts have generally held that a hiring policy is 
valid when it discriminates on the basis of gender to protect an employer’s 
interest in its clientele not being viewed or touched by members of the 
opposite sex.61  Surprisingly, the majority of the privacy interest BFOQ 
cases have arisen in a context where the third-party clientele are offered 
minimal privacy: correctional facilities.62  Courts have found that the 
privacy interests of prisoners – in being patted down during safety sweeps 
or viewed improperly by opposite-sex correctional officers – legitimizes an 
 
 57.  Compare Sharon M. McGowan, The Bona Fide Body: Title VII’s Last Bastion of 
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 12 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 77 (2003) [hereinafter 
McGowan], with Kapczynski, supra note 30 (articulating how heteronormative stereotypes 
disrupt courts’ willingness to impose Title VII requirements).  See also Waldman, supra 
note 27 (explaining the scope of the BFOQ exception). 
 58.  This is reading is consistent with the Congressional intent as the privacy interest 
BFOQ was explicitly referenced during the debate in the House of Representatives over the 
provision. 110 CONG. REC. 2718 (1964). 
 59.  See Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Services, 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th Cir. 
1988) (recognizing the same-sex rehabilitation BFOQ in regards to a female prison because 
many prisoners had been physically and sexually abused by men). 
 60.  See Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
a defendants’ removal of pregnant flight attendants from flight duty was justified under the 
BFOQ exception) 
 61.  See Gibson v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., Div. of Health, 452 S.E.2d 
463, 466 n.7 (W. Va. 1994) (accepting argument that the policy was necessary to 
“preserv[e] the dignity, autonomy and individuality” of the patients). 
 62.  Waldman, supra note 27 at 372. 
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employer’s gender-based hiring policy under the BFOQ provision.  The 
courts have been especially amenable to a correctional facility’s same-sex 
BFOQ defense when the facility houses female inmates.63  For example, in 
Everson v. Michigan Department of Corrections, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals upheld a correctional facility’s female-only guard policy under a 
privacy interest BFOQ.64  There, a group of male correctional facility 
employees sued their employer under Title VII for a policy that designated 
250 positions as “female only.”65  The Sixth Circuit, noting the widespread 
history of abuse of female inmates at the hands of male correctional 
officers, as well as the “reasonable expectations of privacy while in 
prison,” found that the female-only hiring policy was justified under the 
BFOQ exception because, among other factors, privacy was part of the 
“essence” of the correctional facility’s business.66 
Valid privacy BFOQs have not been limited to the correctional 
context and courts have recognized privacy BFOQs in other occupations 
where the clientele expresses an interest in not being viewed by the 
opposite gender.  In addition to correctional officer positions, courts have 
found privacy interest BFOQs in two other occupational scenarios: 
employment in custodial work and employment in the medical field.  
Courts have allowed employers to defend a same-sex hiring policy when 
the custodial position involves the possibility of same-sex viewing, such as 
work in a female-only dormitory or in a male-only restroom.67  Courts have 
 
 63.  See Reed v. Cnty. of Casey, 184 F.3d 597, 599-600 (6th Cir. 1999) (highlighting 
the special protections female inmates are afforded by state law and finding a same-sex 
BFOQ); Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that privacy, 
security, and rehabilitation interests were all ensnared in the female prison context).  See 
also Kim Shayo Buchanan, Beyond Modesty: Privacy in Prison and the Risk of Sexual 
Abuse, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 751 (2005) (arguing that female prisoners deploy the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment against unscrupulous actions taken by male prison guards). 
The privacy concerns of female inmates are often intertwined with concerns of guard-on-
prisoner sexual abuse. However, because this sexual misconduct falls into the physical 
safety interest BFOQ category, it is not explicitly addressed here.  Additionally, some 
commentators have noted that the privacy-interest BFOQ are usually evaluated using a two 
part test. “First, [the courts] evaluate whether using employees of a particular gender 
implicates the ‘essence of the business,’ looking at whether bodily modesty interests are at 
stake.  Second, the commentators argue that courts analyze whether the employer can 
selectively assign job responsibilities to minimize the privacy clashes that would otherwise 
ensue.” Waldman, supra note 27 at 372.  However, because this analysis is not particular to 
privacy interests and is generally applicable to all same-sex BFOQs, this analysis should not 
be considered under the isolation of the same-sex privacy umbrella.  Id. 
 64.  Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 761 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 65.  Id. at 739-40. 
 66.  Id. at 757 (quoting Cornwell v. Dahlberg, 963 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir.1992)). 
 67.  See Hernandez v. Univ. of St. Thomas, 793 F. Supp. 214 (D. Minn. 1992) (holding 
that the defendant university had raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether female 
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additionally recognized an employer’s privacy interest BFOQ in a number 
of cases in the medical field, where the employer’s clientele have 
maintained an interest in not being viewed or examined by members of the 
opposite sex.68 
In the second category of same-sex BFOQs, courts have recognized an 
employer’s BFOQ defense when the employer establishes that 
discriminatory hiring is necessary to effectively address the “rehabilitative” 
goals of a position.  As with the same-sex privacy BFOQ exception, courts 
have been receptive to the “rehabilitative” same-sex BFOQ in the context 
of correctional facility hiring.  In Torres v. Wisconsin Department of 
Health and Social Services, for example, the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals highlighted the importance of rehabilitation in the prison context, 
which only female guards could provide to the employer’s female 
inmates.69  The Seventh Circuit, noting that many of the female prisoners 
previously had suffered both physical and sexual abuse at the hands of 
males, highlighted the testimony of the prison’s superintendent who argued 
that providing female prisoners with an environment free of men in 
positions of authority was necessary to foster the facility’s rehabilitative 
goal.70  Although the court required additional facts to resolve whether the 
rehabilitative goal was supported by same-sex hiring, the court made clear 
that the employer could establish the rehabilitative BFOQ defense on the 
totality of the circumstances in the record.71  Additionally, the court did not 
demand that the employer produce an objective record of the rehabilitative 
necessity of female guards, which the district court had more stringently 
 
sex was a BFOQ for custodial work in a women’s dormitory); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., 
590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (holding that male sex was a BFOQ for a janitorial 
position in a male restroom during daylight hours); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 F. Supp. 
1122 (S.D. W.Va. 1982) (holding that sex was bona fide occupational qualification for 
employment in an employer’s custodial department because duties of custodian included 
work in the male bathhouses where there was no reasonable plan that the employer could 
implement to solve the conflict between male employees’ privacy rights and female janitor’s 
employment rights). 
 68.  See EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr, No. CIV-80-1374-W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
11256, at *13 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (finding that female sex was a BFOQ for a staff 
nurse position in the labor and delivery area because a number of patients had expressed 
discomfort with the presence and use of male nurses); Fesel v. Masonic Home of Del., Inc., 
447 F. Supp. 1346, 1354 (D. Del. 1978) aff’d, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that a 
nursing home had a factual basis for believing that the employment of a male nurse’s aide 
would “would directly undermine the essence of its business operation because . . . many of 
the female guests would not consent to intimate personal care by males”). 
 69.  Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1530-32 (7th Cir. 
1988). 
 70.  Id. at 1530. 
 71.  Id. at 1532. 
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required.72  Courts have also entertained the idea of a same-sex 
rehabilitative BFOQ in contexts besides prisons, such as in a university 
campus security position, where consoling female victims of sexual assault 
was necessarily a female-only position and, thus, could establish a same-
sex BFOQ.73 
Finally, courts have generally accepted an employer’s same-sex 
BFOQ defense when the employer establishes that part of the essence of its 
business is “physical safety,” which can only be maintained by a hiring 
policy that discriminates on the basis of gender.  Surprisingly, after the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Dothard, lower courts have been hesitant to 
characterize male sex as a BFOQ for correctional officer positions where 
the peculiar and unsafe circumstances, like those of the Alabama prison in 
Dothard, have not been present.74  However, a limited number of decisions, 
following the general analysis in Dothard, have recognized that a male-
only hiring policy was necessary to protect the physical safety interests of 
the employer in maintaining the security of a prison by not surrounding the 
mostly male inmates with women guards.75  Courts have been less reticent 
to accept the physical safety interests of female inmates in the correctional 
environment, finding that a same-sex BFOQ for female guards is often 
necessary to protect the female inmates from sexual abuse by male 
guards.76  In this context of female inmates and male guards, there is an 
overlap of BFOQ concerns, inextricably intertwining the privacy interests 
 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Moteles v. Univ. of Pa., 730 F.2d 913, 921 (3d Cir. 1984) (discussing that the 
defendant-employer should have had the opportunity to establish a BFOQ for the position at 
issue). 
 74.  See Griffin v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 654 F. Supp. 690, 704 (E.D. Mich. 1982) 
(stating that “[i]t is consistent with common sense, fairness and the state of the law to say 
that a blanket exclusion of women, in order to protect them from the rigors and difficulty of 
the prison system, is clearly unlawful under Title VII.”); see also Bagley v. Watson, 579 F. 
Supp. 1099, 1104 (D. Or. 1983) (highlighting that there was no demonstrable evidence that 
female prison guards could not safely or efficiently perform the task of guarding male prison 
inmates); Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F.Supp. 952, 956–58 (N.D. Iowa 
1979), aff’d, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 966 (1980) (dismissing the 
Dothard court’s “stereotypical” views of the capacity of female guards to safely maintain a 
mostly male prison population). 
 75.  See St. John’s Home for Children v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm’n, 375 S.E.2d 
769, 771 (W. Va. 1988) (finding that male-only BFOQ was necessary for child care 
professionals working with boys because “[s]upervising violent, aggressive, male 
adolescents involves protecting the weaker members of the patient community from the 
stronger ones . . . .”). 
 76.  Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 754 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding that a 
correction facility’s plan to mostly govern female prisoners with female prison employees 
was a logical approach and would “significantly enhance security at the [prison’s] female 
facilities.”). 
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of the prisoners, which have been discussed above, and their corresponding 
physical concerns.77  Courts have additionally evaluated and recognized a 
same-sex physical interest BFOQ in limited scenarios where the “essence” 
of an employer’s business involves the safe travel of third parties and the 
pregnancy of a female employee, which could potentially jeopardize the 
successful completion of that safety objective.78 
The lower courts’ acceptance of same-sex discrimination under the 
BFOQ exception is not as sweeping as it initially may seem.  Courts have 
generally maintained the Supreme Court’s reading of the BFOQ provision 
as a “narrow” exception to the Title VII rule against discrimination, 
recognizing that a broader reading would engulf the protections that Title 
VII provides.79  Nevertheless, it is worth noting the types of BFOQ 
arguments that the lower courts have consistently rejected.  These 
arguments illustrate the alignment of the lower courts and the Supreme 
Court when applying the BFOQ exception, as well as the extremely fine 
line, and perhaps inconsistency, between the lower courts’ acceptance and 
rejection of some employers’ BFOQ arguments. 
Courts have most readily disposed of employers’ same-sex BFOQ 
arguments when they are premised on traditional sex stereotypes.  A 
number of courts have held that employers cannot defend a male-only 
hiring policy through a BFOQ defense for positions that involve 
demanding physical labor or heavy lifting.  In these circumstances, courts 
have highlighted that an employer’s reliance on assumptions about female 
physical capacity or gender stereotypes about female strength are 
misplaced and do not sufficiently support a same-sex BFOQ defense.80  For 
 
 77.  See Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1109-11 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that privacy, 
security, and rehabilitation interests were all ensnared in the female prison context); 
Everson, 391 F.3d at 754. 
 78.  Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 999 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that a 
defendants’ removal of pregnant flight attendants from flight duty was justified under the 
BFOQ exception). However, in Levin, the limitation was placed on pregnant females, not 
females generally, illustrating a common dispute under the BFOQ exclusion. 
There is a fourth category of BFOQ cases that is rarely considered, in which employers rely 
on federal statutory support to ratify their sexually discriminatory employment choices. 
In Hill v. Berkman, for example, the court held that the Army’s male-only policy for combat 
positions, which has subsequently been abandoned, was not a Title VII violation because the 
federal statutory authority addressed and demanded the discrimination.  635 F. Supp. 1228 
(E.D. N.Y. 1986). 
 79.  See supra Part II. B. 
 80.  Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038 (3d Cir. 1973) cert. granted, 
vacated, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); see also Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 462 F. 
Supp. 952 (N.D. Iowa 1979) aff’d, 612 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1980)(explaining that a refusal to 
hire a woman on the basis of stereotyped characterizations is prohibited by the equal 
employment provision); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Ky., 583 F.2d 275, 280-81 
modified on denial of reh’g, 587 F.2d 841 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding that the employer’s “bona 
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example, in Jurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., the court rejected an 
employer’s BFOQ defense of a policy that prohibited hiring married 
women into production jobs because the policy was based on sex 
stereotypes concerning the women’s physical capacity.81  In Jurinko, the 
employer maintained a practice of placing new employees into the most 
physically demanding jobs in its production field.82  The defendant-
employer argued that the policy reasonably assumed that women, as a 
class, would not be able to perform every production job necessary for its 
line of business due to their lacking physical strength.83  However, the court 
found that the individual capacities of women should be measured as such 
and that the company’s assumption of the physical incapacity of women 
was both legally and logically misplaced.84  Therefore, the court held that 
because the employer’s defenses were based on gender stereotypes they 
were insufficient to establish a BFOQ defense.85 
One of the most challenging areas of the lower court’s same-sex 
BFOQ doctrine – and one of the murkiest in terms of court logic – involves 
the gender preferences of an employer’s clientele.  Generally, courts have 
held that an employer cannot justify a sex-based BFOQ defense based upon 
its customer’s broad preference for one gender over another.  In Fernandez 
v. Wynn Oil Company, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an 
employer’s sex-based BFOQ defense for hiring a male to its Director of 
International Operations position when the employer argued that the 
customer preferences of its South American clientele demanded that a male 
occupied the position.86  The court held that even if the record supported 
the conclusion that a female would have a harder time dealing in business 
in South America due to the region’s cultural bias against women, the 
clientele business partners’ stereotypical view of women was insufficient to 
support the employer’s gender-based BFOQ defense.87  Yet, several courts 
 
fide lifting requirement cannot be implemented by the blanket exclusion of all females”; 
Rosenfeld v. S. Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1971)(finding that the “company 
attempts to raise a commonly accepted characterization of women as the ‘weaker sex’ to the 
level of a BFOQ”); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969) 
(holding that the legitimate requirement of lifting thirty five pounds be open to men and 
women). 
 81.  Jurinko, 477 F.2d at 1044 n.11. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 87.  Id. at 1276; see also Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 
802 (N.D. Cal. 1992)(stating that fellow employees’ and customers’ moral preferences do 
not constitute BFOQ for sex discrimination); Bollenbach v. Bd. of Educ. of Monroe-
Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., 659 F. Supp. 1450, 1472 (S.D. N.Y. 1987) (finding that the 
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have implied, but never held, that when accommodating a customer 
preference for gender supports the essence of a business, it may be possible 
for an employer to establish a same-sex BFOQ.88  In Diaz v. Pan American 
World Airways, Inc., the Fifth Circuit did not accept an employer-airline’s 
argument that its customers’ preference for female flight attendants 
justified their female-only hiring policy because it did not go to the essence 
of their business: providing safe transportation.89  However, the court 
reasoned that a customer preference could justify a gender-based BFOQ 
when it is premised on “the company’s inability to perform the primary 
function or service it offers.”90  Yet, decisions that have formally held that 
a customer preference justifies a BFOQ have been rare, if non-existent.91 
Courts have been similarly dismissive of employers’ same-sex BFOQ 
defenses when they are premised on deference to the employer’s business 
discretion.  Like the customer-preference argument, lower courts have been 
hesitant to accept employers’ arguments that courts should be deferential to 
an employer’s business judgment when they maintain a discriminatory 
hiring policy. For example, in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, a court found 
that an airline’s business judgment, which called for exploiting “female sex 
appeal” in ticket sales positions as a marketing tool in an attempt to ensure 
profitability, was an insufficient justification for a female-only hiring 
policy.92  While the court recognized that the airline’s policy might have 
aided their profit-based endgame, the small gain in the “battle-of-inches” 
with other airlines was not a sufficient basis to support a sex-based BFOQ 
defense.93 
 
school district violated VII when they assigned only male drivers to bus routes serving 
private religious schools that strongly preferred male drivers). 
 88.  Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 89.  Id. at 388. 
 90.  Id. at 389; see also Wilson v. Sw. Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 294-95 (N.D. 
Tex. 1981) (discussing that advertisements of airlines use of attractive females in positions 
with consistent customer contact was a crucial part of its corporate image). 
 91.  Courts have deemed, in dicta, that being female is a BFOQ for the position of a 
Playboy Bunny because female sexuality is reasonably necessary to perform the essence of 
the job, to excite and entice male customers.  See Aromi et al. v. Playboy Club, Case No. 
CS-32986-74 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 1971) (discussing the decisions of 
St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 773, Case No. CFS 22618-70 (New York Human 
Rights Appeal Board, 1971); Weber v. Playboy Club, Appeal No. 774, Case No. CFS 
22619-70 (New York Human Rights Appeal Board, 1971)).  Generally, sexualized 
businesses, such as the Hooters Restaurant chain, which incorporates both food service as 
well as scantily clad servers, have raised questions about the limitations of the customer 
preference doctrine.  See generally, Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy 
Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 204 (2004) 
(discussing the merits of Hooters policy to hire certain applicants). 
 92.  Wilson, 517 F. Supp. 292 at 303. 
 93.  Id. at 304. Courts have considered also considered business discretion argument in 
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At this point, it is helpful to untangle the classes of valid and invalid 
BFOQs, to which there is some degree of overlap.  Commentators have 
highlighted that the customer preference and business discretion BFOQs, 
which courts have sweepingly rejected, are similar to the privacy and 
rehabilitation BFOQs, which the courts have accepted.94  It is undisputable 
that, to some degree, the privacy and rehabilitative interests of an employer 
contain some logical overlap with customer preferences.  However, they 
are not inseparable.  The rehabilitation BFOQ, which permits sex-based 
hiring in order to further the goal of psychological rehabilitation, is 
dependent upon the premise of the clientele more readily accepting the help 
of individuals of the same gender.  Yet, unlike the customer preference 
BFOQ, this acceptance is not necessarily the result of the same level, or 
type, of subconscious process.  A woman who distrusts males after years of 
abuse at the hands of a male is not like an airplane passenger who simply 
prefers female attendants.  An abused woman can react subconsciously to 
reject males out of a fundamentally uncontrollable fear or repulsion, which 
results from the harms that lurk in her past.95  The airline passenger’s 
customer preference is not a result of fear but rather, a different type of 
subconscious process, which is based upon positive attraction.96  While 
both preferences are the result of subconscious processes, courts may 
distinguish between the two because the abused woman’s fear may be 
retroactively the result of a purely negative and harmful experience, 
whereas the male’s choice, as it is attraction based, appears less reactionary 
and seems to be the result of a greater level of discernment and decision-
making.  More likely, the courts have distinguished between rehabilitation 
and customer preference BFOQs as a result of the necessity of the 
underlying employment objective.  Customer-preference is often attacked 
on the grounds that the gender-discrimination does not further the 
 
a variety of other contexts, including female wait-staffs. See Levendos v. Stern Entm’t, Inc., 
723 F. Supp. 1104, 1107 (W.D. Pa. 1989) rev’d on other grounds, 909 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 
1990) (rejecting the offered notion that only men should be waiters in a high-class restaurant 
in order to display a better image to their clientele); Guardian Capital Corp. v. N.Y. State 
Div. of Human Rights, 46 A.D.2d 832 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (finding that an employer’s 
decision to replace male waiters with female waitresses was not justified under a state-based 
BFOQ exception). 
 94.  Kapczynski, supra note 30. 
 95.  See, e.g., Olson v. Marriott Intern., Inc, 75 F.Supp.2d 1052, 1064 (D. Ariz. 1999) 
(discussing the admissibility of an expert’s report that proposed that it is imperative that 
women who are abused have the ability to choose the sex of their massage therapist, 
“[w]ithout choice there is a potential for the reenactment of trauma”). 
 96.  See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. 292 at 294 (noting that Southwest’s advertising agency 
determined that since the commuter market served predominately male businessmen they 
should shed their conservative image and project an “airline personification of feminine 
youth and vitality.”). 
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“essence” of many of the employment scenarios where it is offered, 
whereas, in rehabilitation cases, the same-sex policy often speaks to the 
heart of the employment, promoting psychological rehabilitation.97 
The same-sex privacy exception is more difficult to separate from the 
customer preference doctrine, with some commentators going so far as to 
call the privacy BFOQ an exception to the court’s broader rejection of the 
customer-preference doctrine.98  Ultimately, this is more or less true.  
Privacy cases usually concern circumstances where clientele complain 
about being viewed by individuals of an opposite gender.99  In these cases, 
while the privacy concern does not necessarily go to the “essence” of the 
business, such as maintenance of a safe prison, clean dorm, or delivery of a 
child, courts have acknowledged the BFOQ because of the interest of the 
clientele is often supported by some evidence of psychological harm that 
may result from the unwanted viewing of people of the other sex.100  
Consequently, while it is logical to categorize the privacy BFOQ as a 
subset of the customer preference defense, the courts’ different treatment of 
the subsection, as compared to the other customer preference cases, is also 
logical due to the psychological harm that can result from an invasion of 
privacy. 
II. THE SAME-SEX ROLE-MODELING BFOQ 
A. Role-Modeling: A Confused Acceptance 
The courts have established another bona fide occupational 
qualification, the same-sex “role-modeling” BFOQ, which has created a 
conflicting analysis, confused acceptance, and ultimately raised more 
questions than it has answered for the courts.  A number of lower courts 
have defended employment practices on the basis of this “role-modeling” 
BFOQ, finding that sex-specific hiring was necessary to accomplish an 
employer’s primary goal of role-modeling for its clientele.  Yet, the same-
 
 97.  Compare Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) 
(discussing that Pan-Am’s primary function is “transporting passengers safely from one 
point to another”), with Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 
(7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the employer’s business was “administering a prison for female 
felons” and rehabilitation of the inmates is necessary). 
 98.  See e.g., Waldman, supra note 27 at 372 (arguing that courts have “carved out a 
small exception” to the customer preference doctrine when the case involves customer 
preferences for employees of a particular gender to preserve the clientele’s personal 
privacy). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  McGowan, supra note 57 at 96-97.  See also Kapczynski, supra note 30 at 1270 
(discussing the possible bases for privacy BFOQ). 
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sex role-modeling BFOQ remains unclear because, factually, it often lies in 
combination with other BFOQs that courts often consider and reference 
during their analysis.  This means that, in practice, most courts devote part 
of their analysis to the primacy of the role-modeling BFOQ, but then note 
the legitimacy that other BFOQs add to further the “essence” of the 
position.  To some degree, the acknowledgement of the presence of other 
same-sex BFOQs is logical.  The “role-modeling” BFOQ certainly reflects 
elements of the rehabilitative BFOQ explored above, but it is also 
commonly found in combination with an employer’s privacy or physical 
safety BFOQ defense.  Consequently, while commentators have recognized 
“role-modeling” as a standalone BFOQ, courts have generally not 
recognized the “role-modeling” BFOQ unless it lies in combination with 
another, more strongly established, occupational qualification.  The “role-
modeling” same-sex BFOQ has been recognized in three basic employment 
positions: positions that involve the rehabilitative efforts of youth 
psychiatric facilities or sex victims; the rehabilitative effort of youth 
correctional programs; and finally, moral or religious positions that 
incorporate the mission of their employer.101 
In the context of youth psychiatric facilities and sex victims, the courts 
have acknowledged a defendant’s same-sex role-modeling BFOQ defense 
most commonly when it is found in combination with a privacy BFOQ.  In 
this line of cases, courts have highlighted that the essence of an employer’s 
business incorporates the clientele’s interest in psychological rehabilitation, 
which requires a positive role-model of the same gender.  However, in this 
same analysis, the courts will often note that the clientele’s subsequent 
privacy interest also demand that they are treated by employees whose 
gender matches their own.  In one of the leading cases on the role-modeling 
BFOQ, Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hospital, the Third Circuit Court 
of Appeals noted that the “essence” of a hospital’s business was to treat 
emotionally disturbed and sexually abused children.102  The court then 
recognized aspects of both the employer’s same-sex role-modeling interests 
as well as privacy interests of the children.103  In Healey, the court stated 
that for a hospital that treated emotionally and sexually abused children, the 
“therapeutic mission [of the hospital] depends on subtle interactions such 
as ‘role modeling’ rather than the more concrete behavior modification 
techniques . . . .”104  However, the court noted that, in addition to 
therapeutic goals, “privacy concerns [also] justify [the hospital’s] 
 
 101.  See infra Part III. A. 
 102.  Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. at 134. 
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discriminatory staffing policy” because of the hospital staff’s role in the 
hygiene, menstrual, and sexuality concerns of the patients.105  
Consequently, while the court discussed both BFOQs, it was only after the 
court analyzed both and recognized the combination of the two that it 
found a valid same-sex BFOQ, holding that, “due to both therapeutic and 
privacy concerns, Southwood is an institution in which the sexual 
characteristics of the employee are crucial to the successful performance of 
the [challenged] job.”106 
Courts have recognized the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ most 
commonly in the occupational context of youth correctional programs, 
which, similar to positions in psychiatric hospitals, ensnare privacy 
concerns.  For example, in Leggett v. Milwaukee County, a court 
recognized the necessity of role-modeling in a youth correctional context, 
but only recognized the role-modeling BFOQ in combination with the 
privacy concerns of the employer.107  There, a female Juvenile Correctional 
Officer alleged that a Milwaukee County policy, which denied women the 
opportunity to earn overtime pay through working an overnight shift, was 
invalid and discriminatory.108  In denying the female guard’s claim, the 
court noted that 3,264 of the youth correctional facility’s 3,851 population 
were male and found that “the implementation of same-gender role 
modeling and mentoring . . . provides greater rehabilitative success.”109  
The court also acknowledged that “the importance of protecting juveniles’ 
privacy interests . . . [and] nighttime observation of juveniles in various 
states of undress and in the throes of puberty by opposite-gender staff 
members is damaging and impedes the rehabilitation process.”110  Citing 
the county’s evidence, the court relied on the combination of employer’s 
interests in role-modeling and clientele-privacy to justify the same-sex 
BFOQ defense of the correctional facility.111 
 
 105.  Id. at 133. 
 106.  Id. at 134; see also Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 
1528 (7th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing that the validity of BFOQ can only be ascertained with a 
more comprehensive understanding of the business of an employer). 
 107.  Leggett v. Milwaukee Cnty., 04-C-422, 2006 WL 3289371 at *3 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 
8, 2006). See also In re Juvenile Det. Officer Union Cnty., 837 A.2d 1101, 1109-10 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003) (calling the other role-modeling cases “persuasive” but only 
referencing privacy interests); In Long v. State Personnel Board 41 Cal.App.3d 1000 (1974) 
(finding a requirement for certain chaplains to be male permissible in part because of 
privacy interests of the young boys involved); City of Phila. v. Pa. Human Relations 
Comm’n, 300 A.2d. 97, 103 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1973) (discussing how there is a need for certain 
sexual characteristics in employees when dealing with troubled youth). 
 108.  Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  Id. at *3. 
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Youth correctional facilities, unlike positions in psychiatric hospitals, 
have also been found to involve the same-sex physical safety BFOQ that 
courts have acknowledged in adult correctional facilities.112  In Leggett, the 
court acknowledged that: 
 
[s]exual misconduct in the institutional setting has a severe effect 
on juveniles and damages the credibility and morale of the 
institution in general.  Moreover, heterosexual assaults and 
misconduct are more likely than homosexual assaults and 
misconduct.  Therefore, it is inefficient from a risk management 
standpoint to assign a staff member to an opposite-gender [for the 
questioned position].113 
In concluding that the employer-correctional facility had established a 
valid same-sex BFOQ, the court ultimately acknowledged the presence and 
importance of three BFOQs: role-modeling, privacy, and physical safety. 
Finally, and most controversially, courts have acknowledged an 
employer’s same-sex role-modeling BFOQ defense, even when it is not 
supported by other BFOQ exceptions, in the limited circumstances in 
which the “essence” of the employer’s mission is to exemplify a moral or 
religious life.114  In these cases, courts have allowed the termination of 
employees due to their position as a “negative role model,” usually in 
reference to unwed pregnant females.115  In Chambers v. Omaha Girls 
Club, Inc., the leading opinion on the “negative role model” BFOQ 
exception, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a negative role 
model BFOQ defense when an after-school club fired an unmarried female 
 
 112.  Id. at *2.  See also St. John’s Home for Children v. W. Va. Human Rights 
Comm’n, 375 S.E.2d 769, 771 (W. Va. 1988) (finding that male-only BFOQ was necessary 
for child care professionals working with boys because “[s]upervising violent, aggressive, 
male adolescents involves protecting the weaker members of the patient community from 
the stronger ones . . . .”). 
 113.  Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2. In these scenarios, it appears that the courts’ 
concerns are actually the inverse of gender concerns in the adult correctional setting. 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335 (1977).  The court is worried about female guards 
sexually abusing and physically assaulting the male juveniles while in adult settings, as in 
Dothard, the court worried about female guards being physically assaulted by the inmates 
due to their inherent womanhood.  Id.  Ultimately, therefore, the court’s concerns here are 
actually more reflective of the abuse scheme that courts have recognized in the male-guard 
and female-inmate populations of the adult correctional facilities. 
 114.  Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987).  See also 
Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch., 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980) (finding an issue of 
material fact as to whether a teacher’s pregnancy validated the school’s dismissal of her 
under the BFOQ exception); Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr. of Dublin, Cal., 805 F. Supp. 
802, 808 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (acknowledging that the defendant could assert that the employee 
needed to be a “role model” given their moral views). 
 115.  Chambers, 834 F.2d 697 at 705. 
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instructor after she informed her employer that she was pregnant.116  During 
the trial, the employer, a club designed to assist African American 
adolescent girls, highlighted that the club emphasized relationship-building 
between staff-members and the youth and also that it trained its instructors 
to act as role models in the hope that the girls would emulate the adults’ 
behavior.117  The court found that the club’s rule banning single parent 
pregnancies among its staff members was valid and recognized that “the 
role model rule [was] reasonably necessary to the Club’s operations” and, 
thus, the court held that the role model rule qualified as a bona fide 
occupational qualification.118 
Religious employers have also been successful in defending their 
termination policies based upon a negative role-modeling BFOQ.119  For 
example, in Harvey v. Young Women Christian Association, the court 
ratified the termination of an unwed pregnant African American 
counselor.120  There, the employer, the Young Women Christian 
Association (YWCA), argued that the counselor’s status as a single 
pregnant female was “contrary to the Purpose [sic] and philosophy [of the 
position] and violated plaintiff’s agreement to espouse these principles in 
her employment.”121  The court accepted the argument, finding that the 
employee’s agreement to highlight the goals and philosophy of the YWCA 
to the young members established a rational relationship between the 
demands of her employment and the contrary opinion of her unwed 
pregnancy, which was exacerbated by her stated desire to advertise her 
condition of pregnancy.122  Ultimately, the court found for the defendant-
employer, implicitly accepting the legitimacy of the negative role model 
BFOQ defense and utilizing it to inoculate the employer’s decision to 
terminate the employee.123 
B. Lower Court Rejection of Employers’ Role-Modeling BFOQ 
Arguments 
Like the cases where courts have accepted the role-modeling BFOQ, it 
is easiest to understand the cases where the courts have rejected the role-
modeling argument when the cases are divided by occupational theme.  
 
 116.  Id. at 698. 
 117.  Id. at 699. 
 118.  Id. at 705. 
 119.  Harvey v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, 533 F.Supp. 949 (W.D. N.C. 1982). 
 120.  Id. at 954. 
 121.  Id. at 954-55. 
 122.  Id. at 955. 
 123.  Id. 
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Surprisingly, the factual circumstances of the rejected cases are often quite 
similar to the factual background of the cases where the courts have 
recognized the role-modeling BFOQ.  Despite the factual similarities, the 
cases where courts have rejected the BFOQ exception are distinguished by 
the courts findings, which do not acknowledge the presence of another 
same-sex BFOQ.  For example, in Jatczak v. Ochburg, a federal district 
court ruled that an employer, whose business was counseling mentally ill 
youth, failed to demonstrate that there was any type of same-sex BFOQ for 
its counseling positions.124  The employer in Jatczak, a sheltered workshop 
and community mental health program for young adults, argued that it was 
necessary to fill a vacant counseling position with a male because it was 
necessary to have a male role model for the predominantly male workshop 
population.125  The employer specifically highlighted the program’s large 
African American population, who were often involved in family situations 
lacking a father or significant male role model.126  Additionally, the 
employer argued that it was necessary to hire a male to provide counseling 
in sexuality and sexual development.127  Yet, the court characterized the 
sheltered workshop’s argument for a male role model as an argument for 
the customer-preference of its youth clientele.128  Ultimately, although the 
court recognized that a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ might be 
appropriate in some circumstances, there, the defendant-employer had 
failed to meet its burden of proving that a male counselor was essential to 
the function of the workshop and, consequently, the court rejected the 
gender-based hiring decision.129 
Jatczak is illuminating.  In Jatczak, the defendant-employer raised 
many of the same role-modeling arguments that other courts had ratified, 
but in this instance the court rejected their arguments.  Unlike the same-sex 
role-modeling BFOQ cases where the court recognized the legitimacy of 
the BFOQ, in Jatczak, the court did not acknowledge the presence of 
additional same-sex BFOQs.130  Consequently, this is a case of the role-
modeling argument standing alone, unsupported by a factual finding of 
another BFOQ.  As a result, the court’s analysis yields a customer 
preference argument as opposed to acknowledging the legitimacy of the 
same-sex BFOQ. 
Yet, this analysis appears to be flawed.  To understand why the same-
 
 124.  Jatczak v. Ochburg, 540 F.Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
 125.  Id. at 704. 
 126.  Id. at 700. 
 127.  Id. at 700-01. 
 128.  Id. at 703-04. 
 129.  Id. at 705. 
 130.  Id. 
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sex role-modeling BFOQ does not fall under the customer preference 
umbrella, it is necessary to reassess the court’s rejection of the customer 
preference BFOQ.  In the line of cases where the defendant-employer has 
argued that a customer-preference justifies the sex-based hiring, courts 
have looked to the “essence” of the business, construed narrowly, to 
determine whether or not argument has merit.131  In Fernandez v. Wynn Oil 
Company the court determined that the essence of the position was to do 
business with South Americans, which could be accomplished by both 
sexes.132  In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the court 
determined that essence of the business was safe travel, and held that flight 
attendants of both sexes could accomplish that task.133 
Comparatively, in cases of sexual victim and mental health counseling 
and rehabilitation, the “preference” of the customers is not really at issue.  
If construed insensitively, the gender preference of the youth-victims and 
those with disabilities may be central to their choice or responsiveness to 
an individual of the same gender. However, in these circumstances, the 
“preference” is not so much of a preference as it is a reflection of the 
immutable and subconscious feature of their condition or disability.134  
Consequently, in Jatczak, when the court dismissed the patients’ 
responsiveness to a gender as a preference, it implied a level of 
consciousness and cognitive decision-making that is fundamentally 
inaccurate.135 
Courts have also rejected the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ in the 
context of correctional facilities when the employer has failed to illustrate 
that another BFOQ, such as physical safety or privacy, would be 
jeopardized by a gender-blind hiring policy.  In Henry v. Milwaukee 
County, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, after rejecting a juvenile 
correctional facility’s privacy and physical safety BFOQ defenses, 
subsequently dismissed the employer’s same-sex role-modeling BFOQ 
 
 131.  Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981); Diaz v. Pan Am. 
World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 132.  Fernandez, 653 F.2d at 1276-77. 
 133.  Diaz, 442 F.2d at 388. 
 134.  See Ashlie E. Case, Conflicting Feminisms and the Rights of Women Prisoners, 17 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 309, 316 (2005) (finding that commentators and researchers have 
recognized that “anywhere between [forty] and [eighty-eight] percent of incarcerated 
women have been victims of some sort of sexual and/or physical abuse sometime in their 
lives prior to incarceration, the . . . ‘presence of male staff in women’s housing units’ creates 
‘a sexualized atmosphere that is experienced as intimidating by the women’”). 
 135.  The difference here may be that in Jatczak, the court found a complete lack of 
“evidence” that role-modeling was a necessity for the boys, unlike other cases where the 
employers had established the necessity of role-modeling function of the employment.  
Jatczak, 540 F. Supp. at 704. 
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argument.136  The employer’s argument was substantively identical to the 
role-modeling arguments that other courts had acknowledged in cases 
involving youth correctional facilities.137  In Henry, the superintendent of a 
juvenile correctional facility explained that he had implemented a role-
model program for his youth inmates because research indicated that 
“‘gender mentoring improves the chances of child behavior changes being 
positive’.”138  Consequently, to support the role-modeling program he had 
initiated, the superintendent found it necessary to hire same-sex 
correctional officers for third duty, or nighttime, positions.139  Regardless, 
the court highlighted that counseling was not part of the official duties of 
the correctional officers and that the night-shift position did not offer 
substantial opportunities for counseling-type conversations to occur.140  
Therefore, the court found that the county had failed to support its position 
that male only positions during the clientele’s sleep was reasonably 
necessary for its role-modeling or rehabilitative efforts.141 
Finally, courts have essentially rejected employers’ role-modeling 
BFOQ defenses in occupational circumstances that do not involve youth 
and are not in combination with other same-sex BFOQ concerns.142  For 
example, in EEOC v. Hi 40 Corporation, Inc., the court, in part, dismissed 
a weight loss center’s subtle argument that it was necessary for a female to 
hold counseling positions at the center in order to act as positive role 
models for the employer’s clientele.143  There, the customers were ninety-
five percent women and the court acknowledged that the counselor’s duties 
included providing instruction on diet programs, counseling customers 
about weight, and monitoring the progress of customers.144  While the court 
recognized that the customers felt uncomfortable with men performing 
many of these duties, the court construed this concern as an issue of 
customer preference and refused to find a true privacy BFOQ.145  
Furthermore, although the court acknowledged that the counselors “may 
serve as role models . . .” because “[o]ften counselors have had their own 
 
 136.  Henry v. Milwaukee Cnty., 539 F.3d 573, 584-85 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Henry, 539 F.3d at 583. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 585. 
 141.  Id.  To a large degree, this argument is the same made by other juvenile 
correctional facilities the cases are essentially factually indistinguishable. The court here 
distinguished Torres on the grounds that the same-sex role-modeling policy there was more 
narrowly tailored.  Id. at 582. 
 142.  EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 301, 305 (W.D. Mo. 1996). 
 143.  Id. at 302. 
 144.  Id. at 302-04. 
 145.  Id. at 304. 
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personal weight loss experience and have faced the same challenges the 
customers face,” the court did not recognize this evidence as sufficient to 
support a role-modeling BFOQ.146 
C. Distinguishing the Role-Modeling BFOQ and the Rehabilitation 
BFOQ 
After a thorough analysis of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ, there 
is a question of what distinguishes it from the same-sex rehabilitative 
BFOQ.  This question is important for several reasons: first, it is important 
to understand why the role-modeling BFOQ should be treated separately 
from the rehabilitative BFOQ; second, if the two are conceptually different 
but similar, how can the courts only accept the role-modeling BFOQ when 
in combination with another BFOQ but not when it stands alone?  
Ultimately, the manner in which the courts have defined and shaped the 
role-modeling BFOQ lends it to be a subset of the rehabilitative BFOQ as 
opposed to being entirely distinct. 
As courts have applied the role-modeling BFOQ, there is undoubtedly 
a great deal of overlap between it and the rehabilitative BFOQ.  In order to 
distinguish between the two defenses, it helps to understand the scenarios 
of each BFOQ’s acceptance.  Courts have recognized the same-sex 
rehabilitation BFOQ in circumstances where adults of a particular gender 
have been negatively impacted by the other gender.147  Consequently, in 
order to facilitate their rehabilitation, it is necessary to separate them from 
individuals of the other gender.148  In rehabilitation cases, the purposes of 
the same-sex policy isn’t necessarily for the positive influence of the 
hiring, but rather, to avoid the negative reactions to those of the opposite 
gender.149 
Comparatively, the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ aspires to the 
theoretical inverse.  Employers have argued and courts have accepted that 
it is not necessarily the psychological rejection of the other gender that 
necessitates the same-sex hiring, but rather, the rehabilitation in this 
instance involves the positive pull that an individual of the same gender can 
provide to an individual, usually a youth.150  There is an underlying 
 
 146.  Id. at 303. 
 147.  See, e.g., Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th 
Cir. 1988) (recognizing the same-sex rehabilitation BFOQ in regards to a female prison 
because many prisoners had been physically and sexually abused by men). 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See id. at 1530 (noting that female prisoners had negative reactions to men in 
positions of authority). 
 150.  See, e.g., Leggett v. Milwaukee Cnty, 04-C-422, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2, *3 (E.D. 
HOERNER_FINAL (ARTICLE 6).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/28/2014  2:49 PM 
1240 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 16.4 
 
assumption that divides the two, which is that the youth are more 
emotionally and intellectually malleable, a concept lacking in the 
rehabilitation BFOQ.  Moreover, there is a broad assumption that in 
rehabilitative scenarios, something has gone wrong.151  In role-modeling 
scenarios, there is not necessarily a need for an event or condition to 
rehabilitate the clientele from.  Ultimately, the ideas are quite similar, but 
not the same.  It is difficult to state the degree of space between the two 
concepts because courts have used them closely, if not interchangeably.152  
However, fundamentally, the defining distinction between the rehabilitation 
and role-modeling BFOQ lies in the underlying reason for the use of the 
same-sex hiring.  For adults, the goal is to avoid the clientele’s negative 
reactions to the opposite gender in an attempt to not impede, and to some 
degree facilitate, rehabilitation.153  For the youth, the role-modeling BFOQ 
has been used to pull their rehabilitation in a specific and positive direction 
by using the influence of the employee as a conduit.154 
III. A STANDALONE ROLE-MODELING BFOQ 
A. A Same-Sex Role-Modeling BFOQ is a Logical Extension of the 
BFOQ Standards Already Accepted by the Courts 
If the role-modeling and rehabilitative BFOQ exceptions contain such 
a large degree of overlap, it would be inconsistent for the courts to assess 
the two exceptions with different standards.  Despite the lower courts’ 
rejection of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ when it is not in 
combination with another BFOQ, courts should begin to accept a 
standalone role-modeling BFOQ defense.  Initially, it should be noted that 
courts have already begun to accept the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ.155  
In a variety of cases involving different occupational scenarios, courts have 
 
Wis. Nov. 8, 2006) (arguing that male staff acted as models and mentors for the juveniles). 
 151.  See, e.g., Torres, 859 F.2d 1523 (discussing at length Wisconsin’s goal of 
rehabilitating female inmates). 
 152.  See, e.g., Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2 (conflating the role-modeling and 
rehabilitation BFOQs). 
 153.  Torres, 859 F.2d 1523. 
 154.  See Wendy Bunston, Working with Adolescents and Children who have Committed 
Sex Offences, 21 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. FAM. THERAPY, 1, 5 (2000) (finding that in same-sex 
group therapy of adolescent sex offenders that “the group functions as . . . a safe space 
where participants can honestly disclose their individual struggles. . . .  In particular, the 
boys who have been in the group for longer periods are able to challenge new members 
directly and this process appears to achieve a swifter level of accountability and disclosure 
than would occur within individual treatment sessions.”). 
 155.  See supra Part III. A. 
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led their BFOQ analysis by establishing the primacy of a same-sex role-
modeling BFOQ.156  However, all of these cases have followed this initial 
commentary, which supports the inference of a standalone role-modeling 
BFOQ, with subsequent analysis that highlights the presence of other same-
sex BFOQs, seemingly undermining the comprehensive legitimacy of the 
role-modeling defense. 
Although some cases have recognized the role-modeling BFOQ when 
it is not in combination with another BFOQ defense, such as the line of 
cases that involve the termination of employees that would act as “negative 
role-models” for the clientele, these cases are not truly Title VII gender 
cases.  The courts have acknowledged that it is not really the gender that is 
the BFOQ, but rather the state of unwed pregnancy.157  Often, the 
employers’ conditions of employment in these cases do not simply prohibit 
the employment of unwed pregnant women, but also unwed men who have 
caused a pregnancy.158  Therefore, while the courts have analyzed these 
cases under a Title VII disparate treatment analysis, on the basis of their 
discrimination against women, a proper application of the Title VII 
doctrines would analyze the discrimination under a disparate systemic 
impact standard because the statute is facially neutral.159  In these instances, 
the BFOQ exception would not apply and, instead, a business necessity 
defense would be applicable.160  Additionally, in the limited cases where 
the employment standards in question do facially discriminate on basis of 
gender, only preventing unwed pregnant females from maintaining 
employment, the condition of employment still is not gender based - it is 
based on the alternative lifestyle the pregnancy represents.161  
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 699 (8th Cir. 1987) 
(allowing a rule that terminated negative role-modeling, which included “single parent 
pregnancies,” including both pregnant females and males causing pregnancy). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (asserting that facially neutral 
policies are considered under Title VII’s disparate impact standard). 
 160.  See Harris v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(finding that although the BFOQ exception and business necessity are similar, they are not 
identical).  Generally, the business necessity defense is asserted by employers in disparate 
impact cases where they maintain that a hiring practice, although having a disparate impact 
on a protected class, “accurately – but not perfectly – ascertains an applicant’s ability to 
perform successfully the job in question.”  El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242 
(3d Cir. 2007). 
 161.  See, e.g., Harvey v. Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, 533 F.Supp. 949, 954 (W.D. 
N.C. 1982) (stating that “the motivating factor behind the discharge of the plaintiff was not 
that she was female, nor that she was pregnant, nor that she was black,” but rather that she 
intended to represent to her youth groups a lifestyle contrary to the mission of her 
employer). 
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Consequently, while this lineage of cases leads towards the idea of a same-
sex role-modeling BFOQ, it does not cleanly establish a standalone same-
sex role-modeling BFOQ due to the confusion that the unwed pregnancy 
places over the defense.  Ultimately, both the courts’ acknowledgement of 
the role-modeling BFOQ in combination with other BFOQs and the courts’ 
recognition of role-modeling BFOQ of unwed pregnant mothers support 
the position of a standalone same-sex role-modeling defense. 
More importantly, a standalone same-sex role-modeling BFOQ is 
logical because it is consistent with the standard articulated by the Supreme 
Court in Dothard and its other BFOQ cases.162  By definition, it should not 
be necessary for a bona fide occupational qualification to be found in 
combination with another BFOQ to create a defense if it sufficiently 
satisfies the statutory standard.  No phrase in Title VII, its legislative 
history, or in the precedent of the courts supports the inference that a 
BFOQ cannot, by itself, create an employer defense.  Title VII simply 
states that it will not be unlawful “for an employer to hire and employ 
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those 
certain instances where [the protected class] is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise.”163  Statutorily, there is no demand for multiple 
layers of reasoning to support a BFOQ defense.  The other gender-based 
BFOQs that the courts have accepted have been recognized, at least on one 
occasion, on their own merit and not in combination with another BFOQ.164  
It would be both doctrinally and logically inconsistent to demand this 
stringent combination of BFOQ support for only the same-sex role-
modeling BFOQ. 
Finally, while the Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently 
read the BFOQ defense as a narrow exception to the Title VII rule against 
gender discrimination, the role-modeling BFOQ coalesces with the courts’ 
limited reading of the provision.  Stated bluntly, there are many 
occupational circumstances, including the positions already highlighted by 
the courts, where same-sex role-modeling “is reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation or essence of defendant’s business.”165  In employment 
contracts where the necessity of moral character is considered, role-
modeling is clearly an essential part of the business.  Yet, the role-
modeling BFOQ should not be limited to these occupational circumstances.  
 
 162.  Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 as permitting sex-based discrimination in circumstances that reasonably 
require the normal operation of a particular business). 
 163.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006). 
 164.  See supra Part II. C. 
 165.  Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333. 
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Commentators have defined role-modeling in a variety of ways, but 
Theodore Kemper, an author of a number of social power and status 
papers, has described a role model as a person who “‘possesses skills and 
displays techniques which [an] actor lacks . . . and from whom, by 
observation and comparison with his own performance the actor can 
learn.’”166  In positions where the necessity, or centrality, of this type of 
role-modeling is clearly considered, especially where youth of a particular 
gender is involved, it is apparent that part of the “essence” of the 
employer’s business is to provide a strong role-model for their clientele.  In 
these instances, consistency and logic demand that the employer is afforded 
the privilege of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ as they would with 
other BFOQ defenses. 
B. Standalone Same-Sex Role-Modeling Utilitarian Value 
The courts’ application of a “role-modeling” BFOQ, which does not 
need to be found in combination with another BFOQ, has the potential to 
increase the productivity of crucial areas of society, namely education.  
Several occupations, including youth counselors and educators, incorporate 
role-modeling as a central objective of their position.  Even within Title 
VII, Congress has already illustrated that BFOQs in the educational sphere 
are different than BFOQs in other employment scenarios.  Congress wrote 
in Title VII: 
 
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, 
college, university, or other educational institution or institution 
of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion 
if such school, college, university, or other educational institution 
or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, 
owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion 
or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or 
if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other 
educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward 
the propagation of a particular religion.167 
 
While, contextually, the BFOQ preserved by Congress in this text 
explicitly relates to religious educational institutions, it is a concession that 
 
 166.  Jeanne J. Speizer, Role Models, Mentors, and Sponsors: The Elusive Concepts, 6 
SIGNS 692, 693 (1981) [hereinafter Speizer] (citing Theodore D. Kemper, Reference 
Groups, Socialization and Achievement, 33 AM. SOC. REV. 31-45 (1968)). 
 167.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (2006) [emphasis added]. 
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highlights that the educational environment, and the position of teacher, is 
inherently different than other employment scenarios when it comes to the 
characteristics of its employees.168  In fact, the religious education 
provision was questioned for many reasons during the legislative debate, 
but the legislators readily concurred that it was necessary for the teachers to 
adhere to the religious denomination of the exempt organization for it to 
effectively carry out its mission.169  At the core of this concession is the 
idea that educational leaders should possess the traits and characteristics 
that they are trying to instill in the children because role-modeling is part of 
the essence of their position.170 
While the implication of the religious educational exemption gives 
some encouragement, more fundamentally, courts should allow educational 
institutions to choose employees on the basis of sex, accepting role-
modeling as a standalone same-sex BFOQ, because role-modeling is part of 
the “essence” of educational positions.  The Supreme Court’s test for 
BFOQ establishes that a same-sex BFOQ is sufficient when a gender is 
necessary for an occupation because it “is reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation or essence of defendant’s business.”171  Clearly, the role 
of educational institutions is to educate their students, or youth clientele.  
But how do we define the scope of what the teachers are supposed to 
 
 168.  See Ashlie C. Warnick, Accommodating Discrimination, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 119, 
169 (2008) [hereinafter Warnick] (highlighting that “[a]bsent the religious employment-
discrimination exceptions, schools would not be able to ensure that their employees were 
devout followers of the faith or conducted their lives as role models for students”) [emphasis 
added]. However, some courts have highlighted that one of Congress’ primary motivations 
for the exemption of religious schools from Title VII requirements was the legislators’ 
desire to avoid religious-freedom complications.  See Feldstein v. Christian Sci. Monitor, 
555 F. Supp. 974, 976 (D. Mass. 1983) (stating that some of the senators expressed concern 
that without an exemption for religious organizations, “an unconstitutional encroachment on 
the operations of religious organizations by the government would result”). 
 169.  110 CONG. REC. 2587 (1964) (Representative Roush stating, “I lived on the campus 
of a denominational college. That college insists not only that its administrators, not only its 
teachers and professors adhere to its religious beliefs, but insists that the janitors and 
everyone else who is employed by that school to adhere to those beliefs. That college should 
have the right to compel the individuals it employs to adhere to its beliefs, for that college 
exists to propagate and to extend to the people with whom it has influence its convictions 
and beliefs. To force such a college to hire an ‘outsider’ would dilute if not destroy its effect 
and thus its very purpose for existence.”) 
 170.  Warnick, supra note 168 at 167 (explaining that “[i]t seems evident that the central 
purpose of religious organizations and their schools is to convey their religious message and 
teachings. The Archdiocese of Chicago, for instance, says that its ‘schools exist primarily to 
evangelize and educate students for the Church’s mission.’  By requiring employees to 
conduct their personal lives according to religious doctrine, religious schools communicate 
to their students the righteousness of those beliefs.  All employees act as role models for a 
school’s students.”). 
 171.  Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 407 (1985). 
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teach?  If teachers are charged with merely teaching the content of their 
grade-level curriculum, which construes the role of educators extremely 
narrowly, then it appears that the task of role-modeling is not truly part of 
the “essence” of their position. 
 Yet, many researchers, educational theorists, and courts, who have 
considered the role of teachers, have found that the role-modeling aspect of 
an educator’s position is one of its core elements.  This consideration of 
educators as role models for their pupils stretches back to the foundations 
of the country.172  In colonial America, communities expected teachers to 
be religiously conservative, morally acceptable, and loyal to the local 
government.173  As the country and the position of the American educator 
matured with industrialization and urbanization, the strict shackles placed 
on the educator’s life loosened, reflecting a weakening emphasis placed on 
religious values, but the inherent notion of educators as role models did not 
abate.174  Today, although under less scrutiny than in past eras, teachers are 
still expected to be exemplars of morality.175 
 Courts have echoed this understanding, acknowledging that teachers 
are role models in decisions that have occurred outside of the BFOQ 
context.176  Yet, courts have also recognized that there are bounds to the 
discretion that school boards may employ when considering the morality of 
their teachers.177  Generally, courts have established that school districts 
may not terminate an educator simply because the district disapproves of an 
educator’s lifestyle, but the district possesses broad discretion when a 
teacher’s immorality in the community is likely to have a negative impact 
on their teaching.178 
In Littlejohn v. Rose, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a 
school board’s decision not to rehire a recently divorced teacher was a 
violation of the teacher’s freedom of choice in a family matter.179  
Comparatively in Sullivan v. Meade Independent School District, No. 101, 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted the termination of an 
unmarried teacher who lived with a male friend close to school because it 
 
 172.  John Martin Rich, The Teacher as an Exemplar, 75 HIGH SCHOOL J. 94 (1991-
1992) [hereinafter Rich]. 
 173.  Id. at 94. 
 174.  Id. at 95. 
 175.  Id. at 96-97. 
 176.  See, e.g., Sullivan v. Meade Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 101, 530 F.2d 799 (8th Cir. 
1976) (discussing a school district’s dismissal of a teacher that was viewed in the 
community as a role model for conduct, which was seen as violating the communities values 
while not entertaining a BFOQ defense). 
 177.  Rich, supra note 172 at 96-97. 
 178.  Id. at 95-96 
 179.  Littlejohn v. Rose, 768 F.2d 765, 771 (6th Cir. 1985). 
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was a violation of community values and had an adverse effect on 
students.180  While these cases stress that the teachers’ “immorality”181 
would affect their ability to effectively perform their position, it is clear 
that the goal of the occupation in these cases utilizes a broader conception 
of an educator’s role, incorporating themes of role-modeling that entangle 
more than merely teaching grade-level content. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court briefly addressed the role-modeling 
argument in the seminal affirmative action case Grutter v. Bollinger.182  
The Court wrote that: 
 
[i]n order to cultivate a set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes 
of the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to leadership be 
visibly open to talented and qualified individuals of every race 
and ethnicity. All members of our heterogeneous society must 
have confidence in the openness and integrity of the educational 
institutions that provide this training.183  
 
Although the Court notably focused on the legitimacy of the 
government due to its racial diversity, its subsequent accent on the “path” 
to leadership emphasizes an accessibility that is reflective of role-modeling 
theory.184 
 Researchers have provided additional support to the courts’ 
understanding of teachers as role models.  Commentators have often taken 
the role of educators as role-models to be so fundamental that little analysis 
is given.  These commentators simply take for granted that it is implicitly 
part of a teacher’s occupation to be a positive role-model.  Jeanne J. 
Speizer writes that “the presence of role models in the learning 
environment has been considered an important aspect [of some educational 
scenarios]. . . [and] [t]he value of role models in other settings and for other 
populations has often been asserted.”185  Other researchers simply state that 
modeling and role-modeling are fundamentally part of the expectations of 
 
 180.  Sullivan, 530 F.2d at 808. 
 181.  Id. at 801. 
 182.  Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003). 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id.  However, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
directly confronted the idea of role-modeling in schools, rejecting “role-modeling” as the 
basis of affirmative action policy because it had no logical stopping point and was unrelated 
to the underlying harm that affirmative action attempts to remedy.  476 U.S. 267 (1986).  
While Wygant is instructive of the limits on role-modeling in the affirmative action context, 
role-modeling is considered by a different standard in the BFOQ context and, consequently, 
Wygant is not given substantial treatment in this Comment. Id. 
 185.  Speizer, supra note 166 at 694. 
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the occupation of an educator.  For example, John M. Rich writes that 
“[m]any school boards and communities expect teachers to set good 
examples and act as exemplars to students in their dress, grooming, social 
amenities, and morals.”186  Other commentators have highlighted the 
difference in efficacy of teachers when they are considered role models.187  
While this does not necessarily prove that role-modeling is part of the 
“essence” of their job, it supports the conceptual framework that if 
educational gains are narrowly considered the only “essence” of the 
teacher’s role, then role-modeling can contribute significantly to that core 
goal and, thus, may be incorporated as part of the “essence” of the 
position.188  In this light, the definition of role model and teachers are so 
closely tied, that some find them to be interchangeable.189 
Ultimately, the degree to which role-modeling is considered part of 
the “essence” of an educator’s job will be case-by-case.  Formal teacher-
student role-modeling programs and informal emphases on the relationship 
between educators and students have proliferated in education, especially 
in the urban context, as researchers and districts have noted the need and 
efficacy of these structures.190  Researchers have noted that many concerns 
of the inner-city school, including “[p]overty, infant mortality, one-parent 
homes, children raising children, racism, child abuse, substance abuse, 
urban blight, declining test scores” have prompted the initiation of formal 
role-modeling programs.191  Perhaps, in factual scenarios where role-
modeling is officially part of the faculty’s duty, it would be far more likely 
in these contexts that a court would find role-modeling as part of an 
occupation’s central objective. 
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the other same-sex BFOQs, 
such as privacy interests, physical safety interests, and rehabilitative 
interests, are present in the educational sphere, albeit to a degree that does 
 
 186.  Rich, supra note 172 at 94. 
 187.  See Thomas Dee, Teachers, Race, and Student Achievement in a Randomized 
Experiment, 86 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 195, 209 (2004) [hereinafter Dee] (finding that 
“role-model effects” lead to student achievement and indicate that assignment to an own-
race teacher significantly increased the math and reading achievement of both black and 
white students). 
 188.  See, e.g., Andrew J. Martin & Martin Dowson, Interpersonal Relationships, 
Motivation, Engagement, and Achievement: Yields for Theory, Current Issues, and 
Educational Practice, 79 REV. OF EDUC. RES. 327, 333 (2009) [hereinafter Martin & 
Dowson] (discussing how interpersonal relationships, like those with a teacher, can lead to 
academic success). 
 189.  See, e.g., Dennis E. Fehr, When Faculty and Staff Mentor Students in Inner-city 
Schools, 25 MIDDLE SCHOOL J., 65 (1993) (defining mentor as a word that could mean role 
model or teacher). 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Id. 
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not meet the level that would establish a BFOQ.  Therefore, while none of 
these interests are strong enough in this educational context to actually 
establish a same-sex BFOQ by itself, courts, which have been more 
acquiescent to BFOQ arguments when other interests are present, should 
more readily accept the role-modeling BFOQ in an educational 
employment case when the other interests are lurking in the factual 
background of the case.192  A court’s analysis of the privacy, physical 
safety, and rehabilitative interests of a school will differ factually from case 
to case, but generalizing can serve to illustrate the basic premise of the 
argument.  While the interests of many same-sex BFOQs are present in the 
educational context, the privacy concerns of students are likely an issue at 
almost every grade level.  The Supreme Court has considered the privacy 
interests of public school students in a variety of Fourth Amendment cases, 
illustrating the specter of privacy invasion that looms in the public school 
environment.193  While the accepted privacy BFOQ cases have mostly dealt 
with same-sex viewing, some cases have gone as far to note that privacy 
interests are concerned where conversation involving private, or sexual, 
matters are concerned.194  Consequently, in some school districts, especially 
those that require heavy searches or observation by teachers, the same-sex 
privacy interests of its students may support a same-sex hiring decision.  
Perhaps, if a school were to illustrate physical safety or rehabilitative 
interests, hiring decisions based on same-sex role-modeling could be 
supported by the additional physical restraint or rehabilitative concerns that 
are only possible through gender-based hiring.195 
C. The Potential Achievement Gains Made by the Hiring of Same-Sex 
Teachers 
A standalone same-sex role-modeling BFOQ would provide 
 
 192.  See supra Part III. A. 
 193.  See, e.g., Shannon O’Pry, A Constitutional Mosh Pit: The Fourth Amendment, 
Suspicionless Searches, and the Toughest Public School Drug Testing Policy in America, 33 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 151, 166-238 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
involving searches of students on school grounds and the application to various scenarios). 
 194.  Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-133 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 195.   These ideas may seem far-fetched, but the diversity of the educational landscape in 
the United States, which can often involve both orderly and violent schools, not all that 
dissimilar from a prison, and students who have mental health or learning disability issues, 
not dissimilar from those in psychiatric hospitals, suggests that there may be utility for such 
a rule.  See generally, Kari L. Higbee, Student Privacy Rights: Drug Testing and Fourth 
Amendment Protections, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 361, 365 (2005) (stating that “[w]ith the influx of 
school-related violence and increasing drug-related problems, school administrators have 
necessarily taken measures to prevent such disciplinary problems”). 
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educational institutions and administrations with the hiring discretion that 
they require to maximize their students’ educational opportunities.  
Initially, it should be highlighted that many of the gains made by students 
through role-modeling are not quantifiable in terms of academic gains.  
Role-modeling, as a concept, serves primarily to provide students with an 
exemplar for them to mirror; copying teacher mindsets and habits primarily 
deals with intangible characteristics.  However, it is not as if an educator 
teaches a class well and, in turn, the students, in viewing him or her as a 
role model, then automatically begin to learn well.  The students do not 
replicate a carbon copy of the teacher’s successful actions.  It is the 
mindsets and habits, not the success, that the students are mirroring.196  
Therefore, it is possible that many of the gains made by students through 
role-modeling, by learning to mirror their teacher’s habits and traits, would 
improve in many ways that may not ultimately yield quantifiable outcomes.  
However, many of the characteristics that teachers model for their students, 
such as perseverance, method, and adaptability, could – and do – 
eventually lead to student emulation and, ultimately, academic 
achievement.197 
Research has shown that a teacher’s role in a student’s life is one of 
the greatest factors in determining their academic success.198  Both 
common sense and empirical research have illustrated that the achievement 
of students can vary widely depending on the assignment of their teacher.199  
With the United States slipping in the world educational rankings for both 
language and math,200 researchers should examine the root causes and 
 
 196.  See Anthony F. Grasha, A Matter of Style: The Teacher as Expert, Formal 
Authority, Personal Model, Facilitator, and Delegator, COLLEGE TEACHING, Fall 1994, at 
142 (discussing the variety of styles employed by teachers). 
 197.  Martin & Dowson, supra note 188 at 331. 
 198.  See GEORGE D. KUH, ET. AL., WHAT MATTERS TO STUDENT SUCCESS: A REVIEW OF 
THE LITERATURE 34 (2006) (“[v]irtually everyone agrees that student-faculty interaction is 
an important factor in student success”). 
 199.  See, e.g., Andrew J. Wayne & Peter Youngs, Teacher Characteristics and Student 
Achievement Gains: A Review, REV. OF EDUC. RES., Spring 2003, at 89, 101 [hereinafter 
Wayne & Youngs] (noting that while research is mixed, there is evidence that shows that 
years of teaching experience, the selectivity of undergraduate institution, teachers’ test 
scores, and regular licensure are associated with higher student achievement); Jonah E. 
Rockoff, The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel 
Data, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 247, 251 (2004) (concluding that “teacher quality may be a key 
instrument in improving student outcomes.”).  Cf. C. Kirabo Jackson, Student 
Demographics, Teacher Sorting and Teacher Quality: Evidence From the End of School 
Desegregation, 27 J. OF LAB. ECON. 213, 249 (2009) (discussing the decrease of quality 
teachers in certain schools saw a diminished “teacher value added”). 
 200.  Jessica Shepherd, World education rankings: which country does best at reading, 
maths and science? THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 7, 2010, 10:43 PM, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/dec/07/world-education-rankings-maths-
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possible solutions for the decline.201  Teachers, as the educational system’s 
most fundamental resource, have received a large degree of attention.202  
While some reports have studied the quantity of teachers necessary to attain 
a satisfactory education, others, recognizing the limited resources of the 
public education system, have focused on the quality of teachers in an 
attempt to divine what characteristics make an “effective” teacher.203  This 
research has produced a large body of results, some of which is conflicting, 
and some of which is common sense.204  However, there is a growing 
consensus among all researchers that all systemic decisions that can be 
made to increase the quality and impact of a teacher is crucial to the vitality 
of the public education system in the United States205 
Research has found that one of the ways that teachers increase their 
impact is tied closely to the concept of role-modeling.  A number of studies 
have found that teachers are more effective at teaching students who belong 
to the same demographic group as them.206  If students do in fact achieve at 
a higher rate when they are being taught by an individual of the same 
demographic group, it is worth highlighting the researchers’ explanation of 
this phenomenon.  Researchers have labeled the increase in academic 
achievement by individuals when they are being taught by those of 
matching demographics as the “role model” effect.207  Commentators have 
hypothesized that the “role model” effect of teachers exists for a variety of 
reasons, stemming from the biases and archetypes of both the students and 
the teachers.208  The broadest and most elusive explanation involves what 
 
science-reading. 
 201.  Greg Palkot, American high school students slip in global education rankings, 
FOX NEWS, Dec. 3, 2013, http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/12/03/american-high-
school-students-slip-in-global-education-rankings/. 
 202.  See Wayne & Youngs, supra note 199 at 89 (discussing how policy makers and 
researchers continue to focus on teachers as a way of improving education). 
 203.  Id. 
 204.  Id. at 101. 
 205.  Id. at 89-90. 
 206.  See, e.g., Lucia A. Nixon & Michael D. Robinson, The Educational Attainment of 
Young Women: Role Model Effects of Female High School Faculty, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 185, 
192 (1999) [hereinafter Nixon & Robinson] (finding that the empirical data of student 
success supported their hypothesis that “female faculty in high school provide role models 
for young women”). 
 207.  Dee, supra note 187.  See generally, Eva Pereira, The Role Model Effect: Women 
Leaders Key to Inspiring The Next Generation, FORBES (Jan. 19, 2012, 6:19 PM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/worldviews/2012/01/19/the-role-model-effect-women-leaders-
key-to-inspiring-the-next-generation/ (noting how the girls set higher goals for themselves 
in certain regions where there was female politicians and attributing this to a “role-model 
effect”). 
 208.  Thomas S. Dee, A Teacher Like Me: Does Race, Ethnicity, or Gender Matter? 95 
AM. ECON. REV. 158, 159 (2005). 
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researchers call “passive” teacher effects.209  Passive teacher effects are 
triggered by a teacher’s demographics, including his/her gender, racial, or 
ethnic identities, as opposed to his or her actions or behaviors.210  
Researchers have found that the “presence of a demographically similar 
teacher raises a student’s academic motivation and expectations.”211  An 
additional phenomenon, which researchers have labeled the “stereotype 
threat,” is the converse of the “role-modeling” effect.212  In cases of 
“stereotype threat,” students with differing identities from their teacher 
adopt a stereotypical view of that teacher, assuming that the teacher holds 
biases against them.213  As a result, the student lowers their academic 
aspirations and achievement.214  Finally, other research has highlighted that 
students are not the only actors in the educational environment and often, 
the teachers’ own biases and archetypes can impact the educational 
environment of a student who belongs to a different demographic 
background.215  For example, in his 2005 study, Dee demonstrated that 
“[t]he odds that a student was perceived as inattentive or disruptive are 
respectively at least nineteen and thirty-seven percent higher when the 
teacher is of the opposite gender.”216  Consequently, it appears that both the 
teachers and students, in perceiving one another and reacting negatively to 
those with differing identities while positively reacting to similar 
individuals, reciprocally impact achievement in the classroom. 
This brings us to the central question: would a same-sex hiring BFOQ 
have an impact on student achievement gains?  To answer this question, it 
is important to inquire into studies that examine whether students whose 
gender matches the teacher’s gender achieve at a higher rate.  Due to the 
recent scrutiny on teacher success and effectiveness, a variety of studies 
have inspected the demographics of successful and unsuccessful teachers, 
while only a limited number have measured the achievement impact of 
gender matching between students and teachers.217  The few studies that 
have addressed the demographic interactions between students and teachers 
have been based upon localized studies with small sample sizes in very 
 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype threat and the intellectual test 
performance of African Americans, 69 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Dee, supra note 208. 
 215.  Id. 
 216.  Id. at 162. 
 217.  Mark O. Evans, An Estimate of Race and Gender Role-Model Effects in Teaching 
High School, 23 J. OF ECON. EDUC. 209,  (1992). 
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narrow conditions.218  In the mid-1990s, a number of studies measured 
student-achievement against a variety of variables, including mutual gender 
identification with their teachers.219  To a large degree, these studies were 
uncontrolled, broad in their scope, and conflicting in their results.220  More 
recently, researchers have narrowed the scope of the tests and have found 
that the results “clearly indicate that exposure to female faculty and 
professional staff in [education] has a significant positive effect on the 
educational attainment of young women . . . .”221  A variety of studies have 
found similar results, recognizing that female students taught by female 
teachers are more likely to achieve academically.222  The impact of the role-
modeling effects of male educators teaching male students has received 
considerably less attention.223  However, Thomas Dee, one of the pre-
eminent researches in gender concordance in the educational sphere, 
bluntly summarized his years of data: “[s]imply put, girls have better 
educational outcomes when taught by women, and boys are better off when 
taught by men.”224 
D. How the Role-Modeling BFOQ Would Be Applied in Education 
The obvious questions surrounding the application of a same-sex role-
modeling BFOQ in the educational environment is how and where it will 
be applied.  Some schools have utilized student-focused programs, which 
are designed to negate the student’s stereotype threat of their teachers by 
teaching the students about diversity, as an effective way to overcome 
teacher-demographic barriers.225  Yet, ultimately, even if this plan were to 
be effective, the program would still fail if the root-problem were not a 
 
 218.  Dee, supra note 208. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Nixon & Robinson, supra note 206 at 189.  A study of the National Education 
Longitudinal Study of 1988 illustrated that female students achieved at a higher rate when 
taught by female teachers, while male students underperformed.  Thomas S. Dee, Teachers 
and the Gender Gaps in Student Achievement, 42 J. OF HUM. RESOURCES 528, 546 (2007). 
 222.  Speizer, supra note 166 at 697 (noting that study showed that “gifted high school 
girls in accelerated math courses are likely to achieve at a math level if the course is taught 
by a woman in an all-girls class or in a class where there are at least a sizable . . . . number 
of girls relative to that of boys”). 
 223.  Patricia Bricheno & Mary Thornton, Role model, hero or champion? Children’s 
views concerning role models, 49 EDUC. RES. 383, 394 (2007). 
 224.  Thomas S. Dee, The Why Chromosome, EDUC. NEXT, Fall 2006, at 69, 71. 
 225.  See, e.g., CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON GIRLS AT THE LAUREL SCHOOL SHIELDING 
STUDENTS FROM STEREOTYPE THREAT – A GUIDE FOR TEACHERS, 
https://www.laurelschool.org/about/documents/stereotypeTHREAT.pdf (discussing The 
Laurel School’s approach and thoughts on the stereotype threat). 
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result of passive student stereotyping but as a result of the teacher’s 
biases.226  Similarly, if the stereotype-threat ultimately is the underlying 
cause, certain teacher training will not impact the student biases.227  
Therefore, only comprehensive bias and archetype training that aim to 
change the viewpoints of both students and teachers will sweepingly 
impact the potential problem.  Yet, the feasibility of a plan of this nature is 
questionable.  Educators are already stretched for time in a school day and 
are unlikely to be receptive to plans that could instead be spent preparing 
students for crucial standardized tests or to plans that seek to change 
viewpoints that the teachers do not believe that they hold. 
Consequently, the most feasible and effective program would not 
ameliorate the underlying biases of the teachers and students, but would 
rather embrace the positive effects that the demographic overlap of students 
and teachers can have on the educational process and rather attempt to 
align the demographics.  Predictably, schools of different sizes will have 
different demographic make-ups.  However, overall, the schools will not be 
single sex.  When courts have recognized the same-sex role-modeling 
BFOQ, it has largely been in employment scenarios where the gender of 
the youth clientele has been singular – either male or female.228  While 
some of the cases considered by the lower courts involved mixed-gender 
clientele, the flexibility of the employer’s workforce generally allowed the 
employer’s policy to gender-match between the employees and the 
clientele.229  However, some circumstances have established the necessity 
of a role-modeling BFOQ, even when the gender of the clientele was not 
unitary.  In Leggett v. Milwaukee County, the court acknowledged the 
necessity of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ for male guards even though 
there was a female inmate population.230  Therefore, it would not be 
unprecedented for educational employers to utilize a role-modeling same-
sex BFOQ despite the mixed-gender of its student population. 
Ultimately, the application of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ in 
education could come in two forms.  First, educational employers could 
 
 226.  Dee, supra note 208 at 164. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  See, e.g., Leggett v. Milwaukee Cnty., 04-C-422, 2006 WL 3289371 at *3 (E.D. 
Wis. Nov. 8, 2006) (approving a same-sex role modeling BFOQ for a predominantly male 
juvenile center). 
 229.  See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 132-33 (3d Cir. 
1996) (illustrating that an employer that had both male and female clientele could assign 
gender-specific employees as it was not necessary to have an entirely male or female 
population, as long as it was sufficient to support the role-modeling objective of the 
business). 
 230.  Leggett, 2006 WL 3289371 at *2 (finding it necessary to have gender balance that 
promotes the role-modeling of its mostly male inmate population). 
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argue that a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ is necessary to correct a 
gender-imbalance in the teacher population of the school and should aim to 
be as close to even as possible.  Thomas Dee writes that “[o]ne clear 
benefit of this approach is that it does not require a clear understanding of 
the extent to which the effects documented . . . are driven by passive 
responses (e.g., role-model effects and stereotype threat) or active biases in 
student or teacher behaviors.”231  However, Dee correctly notes that 
maintaining an equally balanced teacher force would have the “unintended 
and undesirable” consequences of possibly setting back students who did 
not match the traits of the teachers.232  Consequently, if a school is sixty 
percent female, strictly maintaining a perfectly equal gender balance may 
not be an economically purposeful use of the school district’s money. 
Comparatively, a second approach suggests that educational 
employers apply a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ that would be reflective 
of the gender demographics of their students.  As with the prison 
population in Leggett, employers could argue that, in order to appropriately 
maintain the necessary level of role-models for the students, the 
employment of gender role-models should be proportionate to the student 
demographics. 
In its application, the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ would likely 
utilize a form of the Leggett proportion-based approach.  This standard 
would allow a school district to argue that it possesses a sex-based BFOQ 
when, due to an imbalance in the gender of hired teachers as compared to 
the gender of the student population, the employer necessarily would need 
to hire an individual of a specific gender in order to promote its role-
modeling objective.  Although this may seem like an unworkable standard 
because any discrepancy in the student demographics and the 
demographics of the teachers would create a viable cause of action, this is 
not necessarily the case.  In disparate treatment cases, courts already 
compare the demographics of one group, the employed teacher population 
for example, to the demographics of another appropriate group, qualified 
teachers in the relevant teacher market.233  The standard employed in 
Hazelwood, which requires a statistical disparity sufficiently substantial to 
raise such an inference of causation,234 is flexible enough to prevent a flood 
of litigation.  Therefore, in comparing the gender demographics of the 
student population and the gender demographics of its teacher populations, 
 
 231.  Dee, supra note 208 at 164. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 310-311 (1977) 
(holding that comparing demographics of the employed teacher population to the 
demographics of qualified teachers in the relevant labor market is appropriate). 
 234.  Id. at 309. 
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courts could import the same standard and only find a valid same-sex 
BFOQ when there are discrepancies in the proportions of student and 
teacher demographics are sufficiently substantial to raise a concern for the 
effectiveness of the school’s ability to provide adequate same-gender role-
models. 
Taken in the abstract, the difference between the two possible policies, 
one that aims for an even gender split and one that is reflective of the 
student demographic population, appears to be of little significance.  If the 
gender split of the student population is even, then there is no tangible 
difference between the policies, because in either case, the district’s goal 
will be to maintain a teacher workforce that maintains gender balance.  
However, research shows that the gender demographics of students vary 
depending upon the educational placement of the student and the type of 
school placement.235  In one Maryland school in 2011, the female 
population of the twelfth grade was nearly double that of the male 
population.236  Many researchers have highlighted the need for male 
teachers in urban schools who could serve as role-models for the male 
students.237  One study by the Council of the Great City Schools noted that 
in the early 1990s, “there was one male teacher for every [thirty-four] male 
students in urban schools, while there was one female teacher for every 
12.3 female students.”238  Additional research shows that single-sex 
education in inner-city schools is effective at reversing trends of black male 
underperformance and, in the spirit of experimentation against a backdrop 
of failure, an increasing number of schools are attempting to define 
classrooms based upon gender concentration.239  In these instances of large 
 
 235.  See, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION: GAPS IN ACCESS AND 
PERSISTENCE STUDY 42  (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2012/2012046.pdf 
(illustrating that males are almost twice as likely to be in a special education placement, 
whereas females are more likely to be in a charter school); NATHANIAL S. HOSLEY, SURVEY 
AND ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION PROGRAMS 8 (showing that in a survey of 
alternative education programs in Pennsylvania the student gender breakdown was seventy 
percent male and thirty percent female). 
 236.  See, e.g., National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core Data 
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/schoolsearch/school_detail.asp?Search=1&InstName=Coppin&Schoo
lType=1&SchoolType=2&SchoolType=3&SchoolType=4&SpecificSchlTypes=all&IncGra
de=-1&LoGrade=-1&HiGrade=-1&ID=240009001530 (last visited May 13, 2014) (showing 
that there were 144 males enrolled compared to 212 females at Coppin Academy). 
 237.  Inner-City Single-Sex Schools: Educational Reform or Invidious Discrimination?, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1741, 1744 (1992).  See also LAURA LIPPMAN, ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS, URBAN SCHOOLS: THE CHALLENGE OF LOCATION AND POVERTY 
92 (1996) [hereinafter Lippman] (stating the need to recruit male teachers who could serve 
as role models for male students). 
 238.  Lippman, supra note 237 at 92. 
 239.  Kusum Singh, et al., Single-Sex Classes and Academic Achievement in Two Inner-
City Schools, 67 J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 157 (1998).  See also Sharon K. Mollman, The Gender 
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degrees of gender disparity, employers should be able to correct the 
imbalance of teacher gender-ratio to reflect the student population by 
promoting role-modeling, and thus, achievement of their students. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hazelwood School District v. United 
States properly rejected the district court’s consideration of student 
demographics when considering them in the context of a disparate 
treatment case.240  Yet the district court’s consideration of student 
demographics in the context of educational hiring practices was not 
completely mistaken.  The Supreme Court decisions that have interpreted 
the same-sex BFOQ exception to the Title VII requirement against 
discrimination have provided that when gender is part of the “essence” of a 
position, employers may validly discriminate on the basis of gender when 
making employment decisions.  While the Supreme Court has maintained 
that this exception is narrow, the lower courts have expanded its 
application to a variety of occupational contexts that establish the 
appropriateness of gender-based hiring practices when the employer’s 
third-party clients have privacy interests, physical safety interests, or 
rehabilitative interests that would be jeopardized by a non-discriminatory 
hiring practice. 
More elusively, at the nexus of these three protected interests, the 
lower courts have recognized a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ, which 
provides that discriminatory gender hiring practices may be necessary in 
order to promote the positive role-modeling of youth clients.  However, the 
lower courts’ limited application of the same-sex role-modeling BFOQ to 
occupational circumstances where it is in combination with the other 
BFOQs is logically inconsistent with the overarching statutory 
requirements of the exception.  Consequently, the primacy given to the 
role-modeling BFOQ in certain applications, as well as its necessity as part 
of the “essence” of a variety of occupations, establishes that the same-sex 
role-modeling BFOQ should be a standalone exception, which does not 
need to lie in combination with other BFOQs in order to defend a 
discriminatory hiring practice. 
The policy implications of a same-sex role-modeling BFOQ could 
have an overwhelmingly positive impact on the educational system in the 
United States.  Role-modeling has been a consideration in the U.S. 
 
Gap: Separating the Sexes in Public Education, 68 IND. L.J. 149, 161 (1992) (discussing the 
importance of education in promoting gender equality). 
 240.  Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). 
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educational system since its inception and courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have recognized that educators provide a model that students look to 
emulate and replicate.  As a result of the biases and archetypes that both 
students and teachers bring into the classroom, research illustrates that 
students achieve at a higher rate when they are being instructed by an 
educator of demographic convergence.  Research also demonstrates that 
students, by viewing individuals of their gender in leadership and socially 
successful roles, receive a boost in academic performance as they attempt 
to mirror the intangible traits of their role model.  Consequently, in schools 
where there is a large gender disparity in classrooms and grade levels, a 
gender-based role-modeling BFOQ would allow school districts to hire 
individuals to reflect the characteristics of the student body.  This approach 
would provide a proportionate number of gender-based role-models for the 
students that boost their success through the passive effects of role-
modeling.  The degree to which a role-modeling BFOQ would impact the 
educational system is unclear.  However, given the number of failing 
schools that have large gender disparities in its student and teacher 
populations, role-modeling BFOQ seems to be an effective method to 
combat the trend of student dropouts and academic underperformance in 
these schools.  Indeed, it is a strong step in the right direction as it speaks 
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